Papers of the Interdepartmental Conference on Middle Eastern Affairs [‎5v] (10/290)

2
The King of Hejaz
and Ibn Sand.
promissory notes. On the 7th instant the Viceroy reported that a
telegram had been sent to Malleson to the effect that he was
authorised, if necessary, to expend funds, or incur liabilities, to the
extent necessary to secure the co-operation of the railway workmen
in providing the necessary train service to enable him to concentrate
at Askabad the troops east of that place.
General Cox said that the India Office The department of the British Government to which the Government of India reported between 1858 and 1947. The successor to the Court of Directors. desired the approval of
the Conference to the action taken by the Indian Government.
General Cox further stated that the Treasury, who had been
consulted unofficially, strongly deprecated the proposal to issue
promissory notes, for reasons connected with the exchange, &c., and
because it was impossible to predict the situation six months hence.
He reminded the Conference that the Imperial Bank of Persia had
raised 2,000,000 roubles for Malleson, and he thought that this
should suffice for his immediate wants.
The Conference decided :—
(a) To ask the India Office The department of the British Government to which the Government of India reported between 1858 and 1947. The successor to the Court of Directors. to telegraph to the effect that His
Majesty’s Government approved of the action taken and
suggested by the Government of India, informing that
Government at the same time that the Treasury were
opposed to the issue of promissory notes, for reasons
which should be set forth in the telegram.
(b) To ask the War Office to telegraph to General Milne
suggesting that in view of the s tuation in Trans-Caspia
it was desirable that he should proceed to Trans-Caspia
first, in order to consult with General Malleson, and
should thereafter proceed to the Caucasus.
2. The Chairman stated that two papers had recently been
circulated to members of the Conference in regard to the conflict
between the King of the Hejaz and Ibn Saud. One paper, by Mr.
Shuckburgh, advocated a policy which was in the nature of a
compromise, and admittedlv did not go to the root of the difficulty.
The other paper, by Sir Hamilton Grant, suggested that the best
thing would be for us to let these two chieftains fight it out between
themselves. The Chairman said he noticed that Mr. Shuckburgh’s
paper omitted any reference to Ibn Sand’s intrigue with Medina.
The Conference was aware that Ibn Saud, the head of the Wahabi
Sect, had pretentions to the Hejaz, where the W'Ahabis had once
been in power.
Mr. Shuckburgh pointed out that the information in regard to
Ibn Saud’s reputed intrigues emanated from a source that could not
be regarded as impartial, that is to say, from Ibn Rashid, and had
only been confirmed by Captain Zia, the Turkish Knvoy. The some
what alarmist character of the reports received from Egypt had, he
thought, scarcely been justified by events; it was frequently
suggested that something v T ery serious might happen; but nothing
actually did happen. We had just heard of the fall of Medina, and
this event should have a steadying effect. Mr. Shuckburgh said
that the Secretary of State for India, who was absent in Paris,
inclined to Sir Hamilton Grant’s views rather than to his own.
The Chairman agreed that our general experience was that,
if we left these rival chieftains alone, nothing in particular happened.
He thought the best thing therefore was to ignore them. If, how
ever, they did come to blows, and the Wahabis were victorious and
the Hejaz or the Holy Places were threatened, he thought that we
should be bound to support King Hussein with munitions, though
in no circumstances with troops. We might, therefore, if a suitable
occasion presented itself, intimate to King Hussein that His Majesty’s