'SUMMARY OF THE PRINCIPAL EVENTS AND MEASURES OF THE VICEROYALTY OF HIS EXCELLENCY LORD CURZON OF KEDLESTON, VICEROY AND GOVERNOR-GENERAL OF INDIA IN THE FOREIGN DEPARTMENT. I. JANUARY 1899-APRIL 1904. II. DECEMBER 1904-NOVEMBER 1905. VOLUME IV. PERSIA AND THE PERSIAN GULF.' [‎140v] (285/386)

posted In the matter of personnel tire difference of cost would be st.ll more
marked Under existing arrangements, the Admiralty can rebeve at short
intervals the European crews serving in Indian waters, and espee,ally those in
the Persian Gulf The historical term used to describe the body of water between the Arabian Peninsula and Iran. . Consequently there is no need for me,eased pay to officers
and men In a local service matters would be very different It would bo
imperative to provide a certain number of British seamen to work the guns of
vS transferred to the Koyal Indian Marine, since the native crews have
neither lie physical aptitude nor the technical qualifications for service of this
nature These seamen would necessarily have to be obtained by special enlist
ment or bv deputation from the Royal Navy In either case, to retain them
services for extended periods in the e waters, the grant of high rates of pay and
pension would be necessary.
Additional expense would also he incurred on the pay of the personnel of
the Royal Indian Marine in consequence of their change of status, and also on
the provision of docks, reserves and stores of warlike materia , etc for an Indian-
snuadron. On the other hand, we could not hope for an entne stoppage of 0 " 1
present naval contribution. Since a local service could not be expected to
undertake the complete defence of our coasts, it is improbable that the Admit
alty would renounce in full the subsidy which is now paid tor the performance
not only of local, but of Imperial, duties.
12 Thirdly, from an administrative point of view, the Admiralty scheme
would be disadvantageous, for there would necessarily be a duplication of
command in time of peace, and, consequently, a probable lack of complete
co-operation between the Imperid and Indian naval torces m time of war.
Moreover, in the matter of the efficiency of officers and men, we should also lose'
bv the constitution of a local service in Indian waters.
Again, under existing arrangements, the crews serving in the special subsid
ised slops of His Majesty’s Navy are relieved at relatively short intervals, and a
fair average of health is consequently maintained. It is doubtful whether such
would be the ease if the ships were manned by men belonging to a local service.
13. We have detailed at some length the disadvantages which would attend
the adoption of the Admiralty’s scheme. It is necessary also to draw attention
to certain weighty advantages that attach to the present arrangement with the
Admiralty. Under the existing system in which an officer of the high rank ot
Admiral visits the Persian Gulf The historical term used to describe the body of water between the Arabian Peninsula and Iran. once every year, and sometimes oftener, his
reports as well as those of his officers are received and studied at the Admiralty,
and the political importance of the Gulf, which might otherwise be lost sight of,
is kept habitually under the attention of the authorities in England. Moreover^
it not infrequently happens (it has occurred twice during recent years), that
the Admiral of the* East Indies Squadron is transferred from his command to a
seat on the Board of the Admiralty, and is thus able to bring his knowledge to
bear at the head quarters of the Navy. It is scarcely possible to exaggerate
the importance of these advantages, which would be entirely lost to us under
any scheme which transferred the work of the Royal Navy to our own hands. >
14. We are accordingly entirely opposed to the proposals of the Admiralty
to relieve His Majesty’s ships of any of their duties in Indian waters. Nor can
we agree to the transfer of any of these ships to the Koyal Indian Marine.
Any small gain of prestige that might accrue to the Government of India from
the possession of a naval force of their own would be more than compensated
by the loss of local prestige, and the consequent injury to Imperial interests that
would ensue from the disappearance of the navy from waters where its flag had
so long been seen. We, therefore, strongly deprecate any change of policy in
naval matters other than that which we have previously urged, namely, the-
authority to arm at any time, and for any specific purpose connected with the
control of the Persian and Arabian coasts, such vessels of the Koyal Indian
Marine as may be required for service as auxiliaries to ships of Ills Majesty’s
Navy stationed in Indian waters. In our opinion, it is by the co-operation of
His Majesty’s Navy and the Royal Indian Marine in this manner that we sha 1 !
most satisfactorily attain the economical and effective use of our naval forces.
W T e trust, therefore, that now that the objections to this measure on the part of
the Admiralty have been withdrawn, you will take the necessary steps to pro*
cure for us the authority which we desire.