'SUMMARY OF THE PRINCIPAL EVENTS AND MEASURES OF THE VICEROYALTY OF HIS EXCELLENCY LORD CURZON OF KEDLESTON, VICEROY AND GOVERNOR-GENERAL OF INDIA IN THE FOREIGN DEPARTMENT. I. JANUARY 1899-APRIL 1904. II. DECEMBER 1904-NOVEMBER 1905. VOLUME IV. PERSIA AND THE PERSIAN GULF.' [‎131r] (266/386)

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Enclosure to 2-
MINUTE BY HIS EXCELLENCY THE VICEKOY.
This is one of the most difficult questions with which I have been called
upon to deal. The rival considerations, whether they relate to the elucidation
of political facts, or to the deter nination of a course of action based partly upon
political, partly upon strategical, considerations are so evenly balanced that one
may well hesitate to decide between them. Moreover, the political feature,
against which our action, whatever form it may take, is intended as a safeguard,
is^itself so shrouded in obscurity and so little admits of confident forecast that
it is exceedingly difficult to adjust the means that we are now called upon to
adopt to the end that we have in view.
That end may he described both in a negative and in a positive aspect.
Negatively we desire to exclude from the Musandim promontory in particular,
and from \be Batineh coast in general, the ships or forces of any foreign Power.
Now the only foreign Povers who require at present to he considered in such
a context are France and Russia. Either Power might in time .of trouble
desire to take possession of a port or coaling station at some point of this
projection on the Arabian coast. Still more might they contemplate such a
proceeding, if wc had been driven by Russian action or Russian intrigue, to
occupy the islands on the opposite or northern shore of the Persian Gulf—mz ,
Hormuz, Kishm and Henjam. The sam^ reasons that render it so important
for Spain (having lost Gibraltar) to retain Ceuta, and that would drive the
European Powers into a ferment, if, in addition to the possession of Gibraltar,
we w< re to occupy either Ceuta or Tangier, will—on the more extended sphere
of action of the Persian Gulf—tempt our rivals, in the event of our seizing one
side of the gateway, to plant themselves upon the other. If it be objected that
neither France nor Russia is at all likely to take up a position in so. isolated a
situation, where they would possess neither hinterland nor communication with
any interior base, I think that Gibraltar again supplies the answer. If a port
or harbour is occupied for purely naval and strategical purposes, political
considerations are waived. This is exactly what we ourselves did in the case of
Wei-Hai-Wei. Requiring the place solely for the above nam^d reasons, wo
hastenel to Germany (who had never consulted us about Kiao.-Chau) and
pledged ourselves not to push into the interior nor to build a railway. It is
clear therefore that isolated naval bases are not uncommonly acquired without
reference to land communications Experience, however, shows that the base
once occupied, territorial acquisition tends to follow. Thus the seizure of Aden
has gradually been followed by the extension of a Protectorate over the hinter
land, that now stretches inland for a breadth of 00 miles. Similarly the
possession of Singapore has been followed not only by the absorption of the
island but of all the adjacent States on the Malay Peninsula; and the occupa
tion of Hong Kong has led to the gradual acquisition of a big slice of Kowloon.
Should the French or the Russians therefore ever desire, on grounds of polipy
or strategy, to establish themselves on the Musandim peninsula or in its
neighbourhood, I do not think that the remoteness or detachment of the 1
situ tion would deter them from the step.
Neither do I think that they would be deterred by the climate. Bunder
Abbas is now represented as one of the most detestable places on the face of the
globe. But that did not prevent Ormuz, wdiich is separated from it only by a
few miles, from becoming the seat of Portuguese sovereignty, and one of the
greatest emporia of Asiatic trade. Besides, the occupation ol a naval base does
not necessarily involve a large permanent European garrison, or colonisation
on a l&rge scale. Even if the occupation were temporary only, and wore
undertaken for the purposes of a particular campaign, with no intention oi
being ultimately persevered in, it might not, on that account, be less disagree
able or less dangerous to us.
Supposing therefore that at a time of crisis France and Russia in combin
ation, or either Power singly, contemplate seizing a harbour on that part of the
Arabian-coast, what is there (apart from the risk of hostilities with Great Britain)