'SUMMARY OF THE PRINCIPAL EVENTS AND MEASURES OF THE VICEROYALTY OF HIS EXCELLENCY LORD CURZON OF KEDLESTON, VICEROY AND GOVERNOR-GENERAL OF INDIA IN THE FOREIGN DEPARTMENT. I. JANUARY 1899-APRIL 1904. II. DECEMBER 1904-NOVEMBER 1905. VOLUME IV. PERSIA AND THE PERSIAN GULF.' [‎114r] (232/386)

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86 . On the other hand, the line which would give us what was wanted
and would not interfere with the Persian routes, was as follows i i.e. t from p^alc
7033 (near Bagaiwad Pass) along the main watershed to just beyond the
Bandi Pass, and thence in straight lines, or along the crests of ridges between
nullahs to Mina Bazar and the highest peak of Lar Koh (peak 7766) and
thence in a straight line to the highest peak of the Koh-i-Malik Siah.
87. This line disposed of the previous objections and gave as a boundary
not only the western and main watershed of the Kncha river and its affluents
but the watershed also of the Piran river. It left our. Bobat post 2,552
yards within our territory, instead of only 423 yards as in the case of the
Holdich line.
88 . Colonel McMahon, however, had small hopes of locally obtaining this
rectification of boundary involved by the adoption of the latter line. ^ On the
map given to the Persian Commissioner, Kacha Koh and Lar Koh were
distinctly shown as separate ranges and the latter was shown as further
in Persian territory than it really is. He proposed, however, that the
Persian Government should be pressed to agree to the slight rectification and
to send the Yamin instructions to demarcate accordingly. Mr. Grant Buff on
being consulted concurred in the above proposal, but the Government of India
decided to await the Minister’s return to Tehran. The real difficulty in the
proposed rectification as Sir A. Hardinge pointed out later (17th January 1905)
arose from the fact that the Russians wmild insist that it involved a real rectifi
cation of frontier to our advantage and w'ould claim an equivalent on the
northern frontier.
89. In the meanwhile the Government of India telegraphed to the Secretary
of State on the 3rd January, reporting that the case of the Hashmat-ul-Mulk had
come to a deadlock and that as Mr. Grant Buff and Colonel McMahon had
expressed an opinion that he was not a worthy object of solicitude, a settlement
about Seistan affairs might perhaps be effected by withdrawal of British objection
to the Hashmat’s removal from the Governorship of Seistan subject to his being
suitably provided elsewhere and by a promise from the Persian Government to
recall the Yamin-i-Nizam, appointing in his place a strong Go vernor approved
by the British Government. It w as also proposed to include in the arrange
ment a satisfactory settlement of the Mirjawa question.
90. Meanwhile Sir A. Hardinge telegraphed in January 1905, with reference
to Colonel McMahon’s proposal regarding the rectification of frontier above re
ferred to, that, in his opinion, the Persian Government under Russian influence
would never accept the second line but w^ould insist on the first line which, if
agreed to, would probably mean a state of things worse than the hiatus quo. Sir
A. Hardin^e preferred to suggest to the Persian Government that if they behaved
well as regards Seistan affairs, i.e., settled the Hashmat’s case and grain export
questions°satisfactoiily, the mission, to allay the Shah’s anxiety at its presence,
would be withdrawn without reopening the question of the ownership of Mir-
iawa, leaving to the Persian Government Mirjawa itself and keeping the new
Padaha post ourselves; treating the intervening stream as the boundary and
erecting a boundary pillar between Robat and Koh-i-Malik Siah to mark the
boundary on the road. He also proposed to ask for a definite agreement for
permission to obtain supplies from Mirjawa and Buzdap. The Viceroy on the
13th January 1905 recognised the difficulty the Minister might find in persuad
in'* the Persian Government to accept the line we desired, but requested that effort
might be made to secure it, and agreed to fall back, if the proposed line were
found impossible, on the suggestion above made. The Secretary of State was so
informed in a telegram dated the 27th February 1905, urging the early settle
ment of this case and he was told also that on the withdrawal of the mission
we should probably have to establish a levy post at Robat for purposes of
observation. In these circumstances, great importance was attached to
the withdrawal of restrictions on export of grain from Seistan, and the grant by
the Persian Government of formal consent to our taking water from Mirjawa
for the Padaha post and to procuring supplies from Ladis, was considered
essential. If the Mirjawa question was settled in this way, it was to be
understood that the Peisian Government would not revive the question of