Skip to item: of 386
Information about this record Back to top
Open in Universal viewer
Open in Mirador IIIF viewer

'SUMMARY OF THE PRINCIPAL EVENTS AND MEASURES OF THE VICEROYALTY OF HIS EXCELLENCY LORD CURZON OF KEDLESTON, VICEROY AND GOVERNOR-GENERAL OF INDIA IN THE FOREIGN DEPARTMENT. I. JANUARY 1899-APRIL 1904. II. DECEMBER 1904-NOVEMBER 1905. VOLUME IV. PERSIA AND THE PERSIAN GULF.' [‎55v] (115/386)

The record is made up of 1 volume (189 folios). It was created in 1907. It was written in English. The original is part of the British Library: India Office The department of the British Government to which the Government of India reported between 1858 and 1947. The successor to the Court of Directors. Records and Private Papers Documents collected in a private capacity. .

Transcription

This transcription is created automatically. It may contain errors.

Apply page layout

lied S*a, when a coaling station will have been conceded to her in Siamese waters, when her
position in Manchuria has been firmly established, and when .temant,me outlets at lahenwan
H Port Arthur, if not in a Korean harbour or island as well, have been fully developed
(none of these bein<r far-fetched or extravagant hypotheses)—stall more if a naval base in the
Persian Gulf The historical term used to describe the body of water between the Arabian Peninsula and Iran. bo added to their number-can any one doubt that the fleet would promptly be
forthcoming, or that Russia would emerge as one of the great naval powers of the future .
5 Secondly it is contended that a Russian port and trade in the Indian Ocean would be
absolutely at the.nercy of the British fleet. This of curse depends in the main upon the
strength of our naval resources io Hastern waters as compared with those which Russia would
maintain The balance is at present entirely in one direction. Ihat it would long remain so
is open to crave doubt. But this pica rests upon a furl her double misconception which m
spite, or perhaps in consequence of its extraordinary popularity, it is necessary to expose. It
postulates that the naval base, once secured, would be lelt unfortified and open to attack. The
precedent of Port Arthur does not encourage this, amiable illusion, dust as by the expenditure
of millions of roubles that naval station has, in a surprisingly short time, been rendered
practically invulnerable to maritime attack (the same m«ght. be said at an earlier stage of
Batoum and Vladivostok), so would a naval base in the Persian Gulf The historical term used to describe the body of water between the Arabian Peninsula and Iran. be similarly treated.
6 Next, the argument under examination entirely ignores what will happen in the
Ion 0, years of peace, and assumes only \Vhat may happen on the rare occasion of war.
easy to say that were Russia to acquire a Gulf port, and to create a mercantile navy and a fight-
in" fleet all three would be at our mercy, should war be declared. But supposing tnere were
no war, what then? In ten years of' peace there would most unquestionably have been
built up a position by land and sea which would be immune from any attack that we
might direct against it: and we should no move direct our energies against Russia in the
Persian Gulf The historical term used to describe the body of water between the Arabian Peninsula and Iran. than, if war were declared to-morrow, we should try to bombard Cronstadt
or to effect a landing at \ ladivostok.
7. Thirdly, the familiar plea is urged tliat if only we were to come to terms with Russia
about Persia—by which is meant the complete surrender to Russian aims—there would be
an end to Anglo-Russian rivalry in Asia, and that the two nations might sit down together
to work out the reclamation of the east. I regret to confess that this plea appears to me
equally untenable. The plan has been too often tried and found wanting. It used to be said
that, if Russia were allowed her way at Constantinople, she would cease to be a menace
to Great Britain in Central Asia. Will any one now contend that if Constantinople were
given to her to-morrow, she would tear up her Kushk railway, or surrender her ambitious
as regards Herat and Kashgar? Only a few years ago the same plea was urged in China—
“ Let” Russia but have a put in ice-free watets, and we shall hear no more of Russian rivalry at
Peking/' I doubt if any one who h is passed through the recent Chinese war will now endorse
that theory. The cession of Port Arthur to Russia was the infallible prelude to the absorp
tion of Manchuria ; and it renders absolutely inevitable the ultimate Russian control over
the northern provinces and the capital.
8. As a student of Russian aspirations and methods for fifteen years, I assert with con
fidence what I do not think that any one of her own statesmen would deny—that her ultimate
ambition is the duninion of Asia. She conceives herself to be fitted for it by temperament;
by history, and by tradition. It is a proud and a not ignoble aim, and is well worthy of the
supreme moral and material efforts of a vigorous nation. But it is not to be satisfied by
piecemeal concession, neither is it capable of being gratified save at our expense. Acquiescence
in the aims of Russia at Tehran and Meshed will not s ive Seistan. Acquiescence in Seistan
will not turn her eyes from ths Gulf. Acquiescence in the Gulf will not prevent intrigue and
trouble in Baluchistan. Acquiescence at Herat and in Afghan Turkistan will not secure
Kabul. Acquiescence in the Pamirs will not save Kashgar. Acquiescence at Kashgar will
not divert Russian eyes from Tibet. Each morsel but whets the appetite for more, and
inflames the passion for a pan-Anatic domini >n. If Russia is entiiled to these ambitions, still
more is Great Britain entitled, nay compelled, to defend that which sho lias won, and to resist
the minor encroachments which are only a part of the larger plan. Like many other students
of the Asian problem, l have often pondered at each stage from Korea to the Bosphorus,
whether we could not, by a friendly agreement with Russia, arrive at such a demarcation of
our respective interests as would enable us to eschew rivalry and to cultivate an amicable co
operation, if not an actual alliance, in the future. At each stage I have found that in such
an agreement the giving would be all ou our side and the receiving on the other. The satis
faction of Russian interests could not be attained except by ao intolerable sacrifice of our own.
Simultaneously my inclinations towards such an understanding have not been encouraged by
a study of the manner in which similar efforts hive been met or have been observed in the
past. The better and the safer pobey seems to hi for Great Britain at each point upon thd
long line of contact to frame liar policy and to declare it. The West Ridgeway Convention
and the public statement of Lord Dufferin that its infraction would be followed by war has for
sixteen years saved the Zulfikar-Bosaga section of the frontier. Persia will not be saved except
by some similar declaration.
9. I now proceed to examine the effect that \VoiilJ bo produced upon India were Russia
permitted t > gratify her ambition by constructing a Russian railway through Persia, and
acquiring a Russian port in the Persian Gulf The historical term used to describe the body of water between the Arabian Peninsula and Iran. .

About this item

Content

Printed at the GC [Government Central] Press, Simla.

The volume is divided into three parts: Part I (folios 5-47) containing an introduction; Part II (folios 48-125) containing a detailed account; and Part III (folios 126-188) containing despatches and correspondence connected with Part I Chapter IV ('The Persian Gulf The historical term used to describe the body of water between the Arabian Peninsula and Iran. ', folios 28-47).

Part I gives an overview of policy and events in the Persian Gulf The historical term used to describe the body of water between the Arabian Peninsula and Iran. region during Curzon's period as Viceroy [1899-1905], with sections on British policy in Persia; the maintenance and extension of British interests; Seistan [Sīstān]; and the Persian Gulf The historical term used to describe the body of water between the Arabian Peninsula and Iran. . Part II contains more detailed accounts of selected topics, including sections on British policy in Persia, customs and finance, quarantine, administration, communications, and British and Russian activity in Seistan. The despatches and correspondence in Part III include correspondence from the Government of India in the Foreign Department, the Secretary of State for India, and the Viceroy; addresses and speeches by Curzon; and notes of interviews between Curzon and local rulers.

Mss Eur F111/531-534 consist of four identical printed and bound volumes. However, the four volumes each show a small number of different manuscript annotations and corrections.

This volume contains manuscript additions on folios 11, 40-41, 47, and 142-146.

Extent and format
1 volume (189 folios)
Arrangement

The volume contains a list of Parts I-III on folio 4; a table of contents of Part I on folio 6; a table of contents of Part II on folio 49; and a table of contents of Part III on folios 127-129, which gives a reference to the paragraph of Part I Chapter IV that the despatch or correspondence is intended to illustrate.

Physical characteristics

Foliation: the foliation sequence (used for referencing) commences at the inside front cover with 1, and terminates at the inside back cover with 191; these numbers are written in pencil, are circled, and are located in the top right corner of the recto The front of a sheet of paper or leaf, often abbreviated to 'r'. side of each folio.Pagination: the file also contains an original printed pagination sequence.

Written in
English in Latin script
View the complete information for this record

Use and share this item

Share this item
Cite this item in your research

'SUMMARY OF THE PRINCIPAL EVENTS AND MEASURES OF THE VICEROYALTY OF HIS EXCELLENCY LORD CURZON OF KEDLESTON, VICEROY AND GOVERNOR-GENERAL OF INDIA IN THE FOREIGN DEPARTMENT. I. JANUARY 1899-APRIL 1904. II. DECEMBER 1904-NOVEMBER 1905. VOLUME IV. PERSIA AND THE PERSIAN GULF.' [‎55v] (115/386), British Library: India Office Records and Private Papers, Mss Eur F111/532, in Qatar Digital Library <https://www.qdl.qa/archive/81055/vdc_100070112822.0x000074> [accessed 14 March 2025]

Link to this item
Embed this item

Copy and paste the code below into your web page where you would like to embed the image.

<meta charset="utf-8"><a href="https://www.qdl.qa/en/archive/81055/vdc_100070112822.0x000074">'SUMMARY OF THE PRINCIPAL EVENTS AND MEASURES OF THE VICEROYALTY OF HIS EXCELLENCY LORD CURZON OF KEDLESTON, VICEROY AND GOVERNOR-GENERAL OF INDIA IN THE FOREIGN DEPARTMENT. I. JANUARY 1899-APRIL 1904. II. DECEMBER 1904-NOVEMBER 1905. VOLUME IV. PERSIA AND THE PERSIAN GULF.' [&lrm;55v] (115/386)</a>
<a href="https://www.qdl.qa/en/archive/81055/vdc_100070112822.0x000074">
	<img src="https://iiif.qdl.qa/iiif/images/81055/vdc_100000001491.0x000064/Mss Eur F111_532_0115.jp2/full/!280,240/0/default.jpg" alt="" />
</a>
IIIF details

This record has a IIIF manifest available as follows. If you have a compatible viewer you can drag the icon to load it.https://www.qdl.qa/en/iiif/81055/vdc_100000001491.0x000064/manifestOpen in Universal viewerOpen in Mirador viewerMore options for embedding images

Use and reuse
Download this image