'SUMMARY OF THE PRINCIPAL EVENTS AND MEASURES OF THE VICEROYALTY OF HIS EXCELLENCY LORD CURZON OF KEDLESTON, VICEROY AND GOVERNOR-GENERAL OF INDIA IN THE FOREIGN DEPARTMENT. I. JANUARY 1899-APRIL 1904. II. DECEMBER 1904-NOVEMBER 1905. VOLUME IV. PERSIA AND THE PERSIAN GULF.' [‎55v] (115/386)

lied S*a, when a coaling station will have been conceded to her in Siamese waters, when her
position in Manchuria has been firmly established, and when .temant,me outlets at lahenwan
H Port Arthur, if not in a Korean harbour or island as well, have been fully developed
(none of these bein<r far-fetched or extravagant hypotheses)—stall more if a naval base in the
Persian Gulf The historical term used to describe the body of water between the Arabian Peninsula and Iran. bo added to their number-can any one doubt that the fleet would promptly be
forthcoming, or that Russia would emerge as one of the great naval powers of the future .
5 Secondly it is contended that a Russian port and trade in the Indian Ocean would be
absolutely at the.nercy of the British fleet. This of curse depends in the main upon the
strength of our naval resources io Hastern waters as compared with those which Russia would
maintain The balance is at present entirely in one direction. Ihat it would long remain so
is open to crave doubt. But this pica rests upon a furl her double misconception which m
spite, or perhaps in consequence of its extraordinary popularity, it is necessary to expose. It
postulates that the naval base, once secured, would be lelt unfortified and open to attack. The
precedent of Port Arthur does not encourage this, amiable illusion, dust as by the expenditure
of millions of roubles that naval station has, in a surprisingly short time, been rendered
practically invulnerable to maritime attack (the same m«ght. be said at an earlier stage of
Batoum and Vladivostok), so would a naval base in the Persian Gulf The historical term used to describe the body of water between the Arabian Peninsula and Iran. be similarly treated.
6 Next, the argument under examination entirely ignores what will happen in the
Ion 0, years of peace, and assumes only \Vhat may happen on the rare occasion of war.
easy to say that were Russia to acquire a Gulf port, and to create a mercantile navy and a fight-
in" fleet all three would be at our mercy, should war be declared. But supposing tnere were
no war, what then? In ten years of' peace there would most unquestionably have been
built up a position by land and sea which would be immune from any attack that we
might direct against it: and we should no move direct our energies against Russia in the
Persian Gulf The historical term used to describe the body of water between the Arabian Peninsula and Iran. than, if war were declared to-morrow, we should try to bombard Cronstadt
or to effect a landing at \ ladivostok.
7. Thirdly, the familiar plea is urged tliat if only we were to come to terms with Russia
about Persia—by which is meant the complete surrender to Russian aims—there would be
an end to Anglo-Russian rivalry in Asia, and that the two nations might sit down together
to work out the reclamation of the east. I regret to confess that this plea appears to me
equally untenable. The plan has been too often tried and found wanting. It used to be said
that, if Russia were allowed her way at Constantinople, she would cease to be a menace
to Great Britain in Central Asia. Will any one now contend that if Constantinople were
given to her to-morrow, she would tear up her Kushk railway, or surrender her ambitious
as regards Herat and Kashgar? Only a few years ago the same plea was urged in China—
“ Let” Russia but have a put in ice-free watets, and we shall hear no more of Russian rivalry at
Peking/' I doubt if any one who h is passed through the recent Chinese war will now endorse
that theory. The cession of Port Arthur to Russia was the infallible prelude to the absorp
tion of Manchuria ; and it renders absolutely inevitable the ultimate Russian control over
the northern provinces and the capital.
8. As a student of Russian aspirations and methods for fifteen years, I assert with con
fidence what I do not think that any one of her own statesmen would deny—that her ultimate
ambition is the duninion of Asia. She conceives herself to be fitted for it by temperament;
by history, and by tradition. It is a proud and a not ignoble aim, and is well worthy of the
supreme moral and material efforts of a vigorous nation. But it is not to be satisfied by
piecemeal concession, neither is it capable of being gratified save at our expense. Acquiescence
in the aims of Russia at Tehran and Meshed will not s ive Seistan. Acquiescence in Seistan
will not turn her eyes from ths Gulf. Acquiescence in the Gulf will not prevent intrigue and
trouble in Baluchistan. Acquiescence at Herat and in Afghan Turkistan will not secure
Kabul. Acquiescence in the Pamirs will not save Kashgar. Acquiescence at Kashgar will
not divert Russian eyes from Tibet. Each morsel but whets the appetite for more, and
inflames the passion for a pan-Anatic domini >n. If Russia is entiiled to these ambitions, still
more is Great Britain entitled, nay compelled, to defend that which sho lias won, and to resist
the minor encroachments which are only a part of the larger plan. Like many other students
of the Asian problem, l have often pondered at each stage from Korea to the Bosphorus,
whether we could not, by a friendly agreement with Russia, arrive at such a demarcation of
our respective interests as would enable us to eschew rivalry and to cultivate an amicable co
operation, if not an actual alliance, in the future. At each stage I have found that in such
an agreement the giving would be all ou our side and the receiving on the other. The satis
faction of Russian interests could not be attained except by ao intolerable sacrifice of our own.
Simultaneously my inclinations towards such an understanding have not been encouraged by
a study of the manner in which similar efforts hive been met or have been observed in the
past. The better and the safer pobey seems to hi for Great Britain at each point upon thd
long line of contact to frame liar policy and to declare it. The West Ridgeway Convention
and the public statement of Lord Dufferin that its infraction would be followed by war has for
sixteen years saved the Zulfikar-Bosaga section of the frontier. Persia will not be saved except
by some similar declaration.
9. I now proceed to examine the effect that \VoiilJ bo produced upon India were Russia
permitted t > gratify her ambition by constructing a Russian railway through Persia, and
acquiring a Russian port in the Persian Gulf The historical term used to describe the body of water between the Arabian Peninsula and Iran. .