'SUMMARY OF THE PRINCIPAL EVENTS AND MEASURES OF THE VICEROYALTY OF HIS EXCELLENCY LORD CURZON OF KEDLESTON, VICEROY AND GOVERNOR-GENERAL OF INDIA IN THE FOREIGN DEPARTMENT. I. JANUARY 1899-APRIL 1904. II. DECEMBER 1904-NOVEMBER 1905. VOLUME IV. PERSIA AND THE PERSIAN GULF.' [‎24r] (52/386)

attention to Seistan, and determined to demonstrate tlieir freslily-gained
authority at the expense of the newly-founded trade which entered Persia
bv the Nushki route. On the 4th May
The Belgian Customs Administration. the Customs of Seistan were
formally taken over by the new Department. The task which lay before them
was one of great intrinsic difficulty. The trade from which they proposed to
derive a revenue was in its infancy. It was conducted by merchants and
carriers who were unfamiliar with the formalities of a fiscal system organised
on European models. The frontier line was long and ill-adapted to preventive
operations. The administration was guided at the outset by no clearly defined
code of rules. The officers to whom this delicate task was entrusted were men
of humble origin, drawn from subordinate posts in their native country,
and suddenly invested with an unwonted authority among a people of
whose language, customs, and traditions they were entirely ignorant.
Within the space of little more than three years five different Belgian
officials appeared upon the scene—M. Auguste Molitor, M. Cesari, M.
Maurice, M. DTIoedt, and M. L. Molitor. Of these no less than three vrere
transferred directly at the instance of the British Government.. But each
appeared no less determined than his predecessor to use his authority for the
annoyance of British merchants, the suppression of British trade, and the
humiliation of the British Consul. The conditions inherent in the case were
such as to render friction possible, if not probable. But they are insufficient
to account for the steady and constant opposition to British interests. It is not,
however, necessary to suppose that each and all* of the successive Belgian
officers deputed to Seistan received direct instructions from their Chief at
Tehran to assume the role of constant antagonism, which they appeared
to adopt. M. Naus and his Deputies at head-quarters need not, of
recent years, and at any rate since Bussian influence has been weakened
by the* disasters sustained in the war with Japan, be accused of any
rrtarked anti-British feelings. Like other officials of the Persian Govern
ment, they were naturally amenable to the preponderant weight of Russian
influence at Tehran, and frequently found it necessary for their own protection
to yield to the insistence of Persia’s northern neighbour. Naturally, too,
the* new department endeavoured, so far as possible, to support the
action of their ow n subordinates. Complaints w r ere heard from time to time
Irom other parts of Persia. But nowdiere w'as the tension so acute as in
Seistan. The cause must therefore, it would seem, be sought for in Seistan
itself • and there can be little doubt that most of the hostility apparent
in the policy of the Seistan Customs administration is directly traceable to the
sinister influence of Russia’s local representative, and to the fact that it is
here that British and Russian interests are at present in most active conflict.
To this cause is due the extraordinary fact that for three years two European
Customs Officers were maintained in Seistan where trade w T as in its infancy,
while on the whole length of the northern border of Khorasan there was only
one such official out of Meshed.
The manifestations of hostility were numerous and varied. The establish
ment of preventive posts along the ex-
Harassment of British trade. tended line of the frontier between Persia
and Afghan and British territory was utilised to enable subordinate Customs
officers to intrigue with Baluch and Afghans alike. The undemarcated
border of Baluchistan became the scene of frequent boundary disputes, the
posts along the British trade route were dependent on supplies from Persian
territorv. ^Old-standing prohibitions, which forbade the export oi provisions
were revived and converted into a constant means of annoyance. Eor over
three years, the Customs Office at Nasratabad itself was the sole station at
which merchandise could be finally cleared. Thus traders bound for
the north had forced upon them a detour of over a hundred miles by the
regulation which required them to present their goods at Nasratabad betoie
they could proceed upon their way. Seistan once left behind, caravans
still found themselves subjected to further scrutiny and examination, wdnle
Russian traders from the north were suffered to pass unmolested. New
rules and orders were applied at the Persian frontier long before notice