Papers of the War Cabinet's Eastern Committee [‎271v] (542/544)

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MR. OLIPHANT: I am uot conscious of having seen any memorandum here
advocating starting from Bushire. My impression is that the first that we heard of it
was after (Jox had had a discussion at Bushire after leaving India. He telegraphed and
said that certain events were taking place and that troops ought to be sent inland. At
this table there was raised the question of the impossibility of keeping troops in the
lowlands owing to the climate.
LORD CURZON : And still further on the undesirability of involving them in
military operations when they got into the hills. I was strong about it. Still this is
really a side issue.
SIR HAMILTON GRANT : The main issue is that it appears to the Government
of India that the general frame of mind in Persia means that we will never be able to
do any good with them until we can alter that frame of mind. There are two view's.
One view is that we can do everything we want in Persia by cash and terrorism. The
other view is that we have tried cash and threats long enough, and that we may
possibly be able to do something by adopting the other line, the line which we find
has paid us every time in Afghanistan and on the North-West Frontier Region of British India bordering Afghanistan. , the line of the
velvet glove.
LORD CURZON : There usually has to be cash inside it.
SIR HAMILTON GRANT : Without the velvet glove the cash would not have
done its work. The only point of disagreement between you and the Government of
India is as to the way in wdiich we should work. We say, give the velvet glove a
• chance. We have never given it a chance. You tell me that Sir Charles Marling
does not agree, and that other people who know Persia do not agree. We have consulted
a great many people who do know Persia, and I am in constant touch w r ith people w 7 ho
know Persia, and a great many of them do agree. At any rate the proof of the
pudding is in the eating. The military policy which we have adopted hitherto all
through Sir Charles Marling’s time has been, I think I may say without disrespect, a
failu re. All that the Government of India says is, “ Let us trv somethinuf else. W^e
do not say that it will succeed, but we hope that it will succeed. Give it a chance.
Give the velvet glove a chance for a month or two months or six months, and try to get
the Persian people into a frame of mind in which they will be friendly disposed towards
us, wdl readily accept our financial adviser, and will possibly even accept our British
commander of the forces.” At the present moment we feel practically convinced that,
after the lamentable Sykes’ experiment, they will have nothing to do with a British
commander, and that we would meet with a flat refusal there unless we absolutely used
force to put in our man.
LORD CURZON : That would not be a fair criticism to make, because Sykes
was not put in command of the South Persia Rifles as a military commander at all ;
he was selected because he had served for many years in Persia, and was supposed to
be acceptable to the Persians and to know the Persian character and people. Obviously,
if there was a question of a military adviser you would pick a man of great experience
and rank, and you would have a real soldier.
SIR HAMILTON GRANT : I do not think his failure was due to his not being a
soldier.
LORD CURZON : The argument that Sykes had been a failure wouM not be an
argument against appointing a British commander of a different type elsewhere.
SIR HAMILTON GRANT: The Persian people would not be disposed to agree
to such a commander.
LORD CURZON: By “the Persian people” you mean the Nationalists at
Teheran ?
SIR HAMILTON GRA.NT : The authorities differ as to that. There is a public
opinion which destroys Cabinets and which makes Cabinets and without which a
Cabinet cannot be successful. All that we w~ant is that you should give this policy a
chance If it fails we will not be any worse off. If it should fail we can take the m >re
resolute line that you recommend.
2, Whitehall Gardens,
December 30, 1918.