Papers of the War Cabinet's Eastern Committee [‎248r] (495/544)

LORD CURZON : Have you anything you wish to say, General Cox, from the
point of view of the military aspect of the case ?
GENERAL COX: I do not think that from the military point of view we could afford
to allow Persia to lapse into permanent chaos of any kind, because it is evident that if
that is the case somebody will eventually come in if* we do not. We must be either in
a position to control the chaos from outside, and prevent somebody else corning in, or to
prevent the chaos from inside. In our present position in the North we can do both—
North and South. It does not matter what the country does inside, we can prevent
anybody else coming in to control. But if we leave our Northern control—
LORD ROBERT CECIL : What do you mean by that ?
GENERAL COX : On the Caspian, and the Transcaspian railway and Meshed,
and withdraw our cordon, no Power in the world can prevent a Northern Power from
invading Persia again, and it would happen. Whether it is Russia, or some Power
which succeeds Russia in those parts, it would be done. We cannot prevent it.
Teheran would be in their hands a long time before it would be in our hands. The
capital would be dominated again inevitably if the country is in a state of weakness
and chaos.
SIR CHARLES MARLING : That is looking forward a very long way.
GENERAL COX : We give up the power of doing it the moment we retire from
the North.
LORD ROBERT CECIL : The suggestion rather is, that if we go away one of
two things is likely to happen. You may have simple invertebrate chaos and nothing
happens. Either of two things is likelv to happen, either that the Government will
keep some kind of Government, at any rate no worse than before we began to interfere,
or they will get into a hopeless mess, and then the people or somebody else will rise up
and say, ‘‘We had better have the English back.”
LORD CURZON : While we are waiting for the Persians to rise up somebody
else will come in from outside.
LORD .ROBERT CECIL: I do not think, myself, until you get a regular
government in Russia there is the least prospect; I do not believe much in the
possibility of a Bolshevik invasion.
LORD CURZON : We are all agreed that we can say, if we are called upon to
assume this role in Persia, that we should be most reluctant ; but on the other point
we rather differ. You are in favour of a policy of chaos, Lord Robert. I look upon
chaos as disastrous.
SIR CHARLES MARLING : Are we endeavouring to get control of Persia or
not? We have every instrument in our hands to do it. The Persians owe us a great
deal of money. We can say to them that we want a financial settlement. We can
put very strong pressure upon them. We cannot do it as a mandatory.
LORD CURZON : I do not think that we can carry the case any further
to-day. We are much obliged to Sir Charles Marling for coming and giving us his
advice.
2, Whitehall Gardens, S. W. 1,
December 19, 1918.