Papers of the War Cabinet's Eastern Committee [‎241v] (482/544)

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rather than of the people, but I think it applies to both—which has been at the same
time suspicious and frightened ; which has been almost simultaneously hostile and
friendly ; which at one time lias been defiant and at another submissive.
What are the steps that we have taken to put these matters straight and to place
ourselves in really friendly relations towards the Persian Government ? There have
been many ups and downs in this controversy ; but, looking back upon it all, 1
personally am by no means ashamed of the concessions which we have been willing to
make and have made to Persian sentiment, nor of the evidences of real friendliness
which we have given. In the first place, we have repeated in accents, the sincerity of
which cannot be doubted, the assurance of our willingness to give guarantees for the
independence, and integrity of the country, and those assurances we are prepared to
renew at Paris or anywhere else. Secondly, we have, so far as we are concerned,
suspended the Anglo-Russian Convention. We have declared that it is no longer
operative during the period of the war. Many of us would have been
willing to abrogate and cancel it at once. It was only because of the
scruples very legitimately entertained by the Foreign Office that we put that
intention in the more cautious phraseology of our willingness to abrogate the
Agreement as soon as there was another party to the transaction, a stable Russian
Government, with whom we could consider it. Thirdly, after a long controversy,
punctuated with a certain amount of misfortune and disaster, we have signified to the
Persian Government our willingness to hand over the South Persia Rifles to the
Persian authorities in the Province of Pars. Fourthly, we have indicated our willing
ness to help in the constitution of a Persian Army, to which this force should belong,
at the conclusion of the war. Fifthly, we have given to them a guarantee of their
recovery of their pre-war frontiers on the side of Azerbaijan. Sixthly, during the war-
we have practically financed the country by our subsidies, our subventions, our
payment of any and every armed force, including the Russian (the Cossack division)
that is to be found in the country. Lastly, when the question of the Peace Conference
arose we offered, if asked to do so, to represent the interests of Persia there, and to put
forward for consideration any desiderata which she might have in her mind.
That, 1 think, is a fair general summary of our attitude, and it indicates on our
part a sincere desire to establish permanently friendly relations with the Government
of the Shah.
How have these advances and concessions been met ? It is true that we have
succeeded, largely owing, I think, to Sir Charles Marling, in getting to power the
statesman who seems at the present time to be most kindly disposed towards ourselves
and who is probably the best that the country can produce—I allude to Vossugh-ud-
Dowleh. But his position is precarious. His relations with his Sovereign are not over
friendly. The telegrams that we have received during the past week alone indicate
that their relations are strained, and I imagine that, but for the knowledge that our
support is behind him and that if he left we should be seriously offended, ids position
would be equally unstable with that of the many other Persian politicians who have
preceded him.
Again, when we came the other day to discuss with the Persian Government the
possible appointment of a financial adviser, and when the Foreign Office represented to
them, with unanswerable force, that, viewing the financial stake we have in the country
and the fact that it is our finances only that are running it and have saved it from ruin,
it was advisable that the financial adviser should be British, we found ourselves un; ble to
press our views with advantage, and we were told that public sentiment in Persia
would for the time being veto any such solution.
Lastly we have the difficulties that are now being raised with regard to Persian
representation at the Peace Conference. I confess that Persia’s claims with regard to
the Peace Conference excite in me a good deal of irritation. The plea upon which she
claims to be represented there is essentially feeble, if not untenable. fhe ground
she alleges is that although she has not been a belligerent, her country has been the
prey of warring armies, that she has been invaded from the west, and that she has
suffered material damage. To that claim our Foreign Office has throughout returned
the same, and, I think, an entirely right reply, namely, that the admission of a neutral
country to the Conference rests not with us, but with the representatives of the Great
Po>veis who will lie assembled there, and that willing as we have been, and continue to be,
to see that her views are put forward and her interests represented, we could not, on our
own responsibility, take the lin^ of saying that we would press for her inclusion.
Our attitude on this subject has been all the more ju Pitied when we come to the
particular claims that Persia has herself put forward, and the grounds she has advanced