Papers of the War Cabinet's Eastern Committee [‎232r] (463/544)

interest of the security of the Indian Kmpire require that the responsibility should he
accepted by Great Britain.”
MB. MONTAGU : I do not like that very much, if I may say so with threat
respect. The real reason why I want England to accept that responsibility is because
T believe we are the only Power that could do it for the good of the inhabitants of the
countrv. You base yourself upon the fact that we have conquered it.
LORD CURZON : I state two reasons, and you have stated a third.
MR. MONTAGU : Would not the Imperial War Cabinet or our negotiators at
Paris put the last reason, the good of the inhabitants, before the other two?
LORD ROBERT CECIL : I agree. I should rather like to say that if they
desire it we think they ought to have it, and that we believe it will be for the best
interests of the inhabitants. In saying this, we do not ignore the fact that there are
reasons which would make it of advantage to us.
LORD CURZON: There are three main reasons why we are going to do it,
aoart from pledges we have given. One is the interests of the people, which
Mr. Montagu puts in the forefront; secondly, the fact that our armies have conquered
these areas ; and, thirdly, we cannot allow anything to menace the security of the
Indian Empire.
MR. BALFOUR : The last you should carefully avoid, I think.
LORD CURZON : I put it in vague terms : “ The predominant interest of the
security of the Indian Empire.” Surely it is obvious that one of the reasons why we
entered into this p;irt of the war was to cut in twain the German ambitions to get to
the Persian Gulf The historical term used to describe the body of water between the Arabian Peninsula and Iran. . There is no concealment about it. I he Baghdad Railway was a
weapon directed at the heart of India. We have destroyed it, and we do not mean to
let it start again. These are the facts, are they not?
LORD ROBERT CECIL: I think the War Cabinet would rather like it, but
from the point of view of negotiating I do not know what Mr. Balfour thinks. T
should have thought the less we said about these aspects the better.
MR. BALFOUR: In conversations with our enemies at the gate I would not
mention it all.
THE HEJAZ AND ARABIA.
LORD CURZON : We can put in all three reasons. Our last meeting was devoted
to a discussion of the question of the Hejaz and Arabia, and at the end of the meeting
the Foreign Office and myself were commissioned together to draw up a number of
-* v resolutions'^' recording the results at which we had arrived. Perhaps the Committee will
allow me to read them. “ (1) It is desirable that the special position of Great Britain in
Arabia should be recognised by the French and Italian Governments, as it was by the
former in the correspondence and negotiations of 1916 and 1917.” The negotiations of
1917 took the form of what was known as a pro jet d'arrangement, but it never got
further, and, therefore, we cannot quote that as involving anything more than the views
entertained by the French Government at that time. But \' hen 1 allude to the
correspondence of 1916, I am alluding to a definite statement that appeared in letters
communicated by M. Gambon to the Government there, in which the French of their
own accord, and unsolicited, did offer a recognition of the special political position of
ourselves in Arabia.
LORD ROBERT CECIL : Yes, and in 1917 too.
LORD CURZON : That is so ; I do not say that it is vital to get this admission.
If there was great trouble about getting it, it might not be necessary to press for itbut
it is desirable to get it if we can, not so much with a view to the settlement of the
Hejaz question now, as to prevent troubles arising in the future. If we can get this
general recognition from France and Italy, it will give us a cleaner slate upon which to
write the characters we choose in the future.
L<)RD ROBERT CECIL : The only thing is, 1 do not think I should be inclined
to raise the matter again with the French. 1 should say. ” M e have* got \ our statements
of 1916 and 1917, and they are good enough.” You might ask the Italians, but if you
do, the Italians will ask for something in return, and you will have a tiresome negotia
tion. They will not grant it as a favour, but will regard it as something that has to be
paid for in some other negotiation.
* E.0.-2703.
ZVL
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