Papers of the War Cabinet's Eastern Committee [‎230r] (459/544)

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two forms of administrative control, one in the Baghdad vilayet and the other in the
Basra vilavet, was really impossible, and that the treatment meted out to the one
would inevitably have to he accorded to the other.
MB. MONTAGU : I have a small point to make about No. 2. It is not one of
substance, but it is this : Supposing the enquiries now being made end in finding the
people of all these districts do not want any overlordship, do not want any head, will
not the word “ Protectorate,” which you use in the second conclusion, possibly preclude
you from setting up the only form of government that would be practicable ?
LORD CURZON : When I used the words “ British Protectorate ” here, I meant
the formal declaration of a British Protectorate. I assume you would object to that as
much as the rest of us.
MR. MONTAGU: Yes, but it may be almost inevitable. I do not want a
difficulty afterwards because of the use of that word, if we are forced to something
that is inevitable.
LORD CURZON : Are you speaking of all the areas from Mosul to the Gulf?
MH. MONTAGU : Yes, I do not think it is likely to occur, and I share your hope
that it will not be necessary; but, supposing you have to put in an administrator, that
is really declaring a British Protectorate.
LORD CURZON : I should put in a British administrator, but not declare a
Protectorate.
MR. MONTAGU : It is a question of diplomatic language. Could you defend
your case if you put in an administrator, and declared you were not going to have a
Protectorate ?
LORD CURZON : We shall have an administrator in any case behind the ja^ade
of Arab Government or Governments. There is to be a High Commissioner in Baghdad.
The argument you apply to the head man at Basra would apply equally to Baghdad.
MR. BALFOUR: This raises one of the most difficult questions. We use the
word “ Protectorate” as if we understood it. There may be persons here more fortunate
than myself, but frankly I do not understand it. It is one of the loosest words, you can
possibly conceive. Had we a Protectorate over Egypt before the war ?
LORD ROBERT CECIL : No, certainly not.
MR. BALFOUR : What had we ?
LORD ROBERT CECIL: No one knows, but we had not a Protectorate.
MR. BALFOUR : Have we a Protectorate over anything ?
LORD ROBERT CECIL: Over Egypt now.
M R. BALFOUR : That is enough for me to go on with my questions. A Protectorate
over Egypt amounts really, for all practical purposes, to absolute sovereignty.
LORD ROBERT CECIL : No. It did before, but I do not think there is a very
great deal of difference between the amount of our power in Egypt now and the amount
of our power before the war.
MR. BALFOUR : I do not care which you choose. 1 will take either.
LORD ROBERT CECIL : A Protectorate is really a formal matter. You declare
a Protectorate. It is what you say you have got, and you bring in any amount of
influence. There is this difference, and 1 think Sir Erie Richards will bear me out, that
thereupon the protected Power cannot have any relations with any other Power; it
ceases to have any foreign policy.
MR. BALFOUR : This is where it is vital. I do not know in what spirit we are
going to be met at the Conference by our colleagues of other nations, but supposing
they put questions to us—the sort of questions 1 will suggest in a moment—how wdll
they.be answered ? They will say, “ You are for self-determination,” and in obedience
to self-determination you say, “ Heaven forbid we should put any Government over
these people that they do not want.” Tlx se people say, We want to be independent,
but protected.” You say, “Very well, we will protect you.” Then my imaginary
critic says, “ What does a British Protectorate come to in practice ? ” it comes in the