Papers of the War Cabinet's Eastern Committee [‎229r] (457/544)

5
i
*
i
Askabad Government fell they would be in a precarious position, and
Malleson was already asking for guns, aeroplanes, &c. Malleson had
been sent up during the war in order to bolster up the Askabad
Government. Now that the war was over, we had no justification
for being in Trans-Caspia, as the British Government had laid it
down that we were not at war with the Bolsheviks.
The Chairman said that we all desired to extract Malleson from
his intolerable position. His withdrawal, however, would mean the
evacuation of Merv, Askabad, and, what was of special importance, of
Kvasnovodsk, which raised the question of our control of the Caspian.
He understood that it was proposed that the force, if it was with
drawn, should retire to Birjand. He thought it would be difficult
to explain so extensive a withdrawal. In any case, there must be
no hasty movement. There was always the fear of a Bolshevik
incursion into Khorassan, and, if we withdrew, the Turcomans might
throw in their lot with the Bolsheviks. In any case, we were bound
to maintain our Eastern cordon, with its apex Meshed, just as
we had to maintain the cordon on the north-west.
Sir Hamilton Grant said that the proposal was that Malleson
with a guard should withdraw to Meshed, and that his force, which
consisted of some 1,400 men, should retire to Birjand. He informed
the Committee that there were rumours of an Afghan movement
towards Penjdeh.
General ihwaites was of opinion that we must retain Kras-
novodsk, and maintain enough troops there to protect from an
attack on the land side. So long as we controlled the Caspian we
should be able to send up reinforcements.
General Cox said that the original intention of Malleson’s force
was to prevent an Austro-German infiltration eastwards. It was
now supporting the Trans-Caspian Government against Bolshevik
offensive from east and north. He thought it important that his
force should remain in Trans-Caspia for the present. If he retired
we should lose the railway east of Krasnovodsk, and the means it
afforded us of sending up reinforcements and supplies. Also there
would be nothing to prevent Bolshevik forces or influence from
penetrating Khorassan. He suggested that we should temporise
with the Askabad Government, if we could not continue financial
support, and wait upon events.
The Committee decided :—
(a.) To ask the Secretary of State for India to prepare a brief
Memorandum stating in detail what the proposals of the
Indian Government and his Department were in regard
to the suggested withdrawal.
(b.) To resume the discussion as soon as members were in
possession of the above Memorandum.
(Initialled.) C. of K.
2, Whitehall Garden*, S.W.,
December 18, 19J8.
[365—43]