Papers of the War Cabinet's Eastern Committee [‎210v] (420/544)

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SIR LOUIS MALLET: I do not think there was anything said about it.
MR. BALFOUR: A “free port ” is inconsistent with fortifications, is it not ?
SIR LOUIS MALLET: Oh, no.
MR. BALFOUR: I think you ought to put in something about that.
LORD ROBERT CECIL: I do not like “political predominance,” but it is
probably true.
MR. BALFOUR: What other phrase would you suggest ?
LORD ROBERT CECIL: Some such nebulous phrase as a “ special position.”
MR. BALFOUR: I suppose you ought to use the same phrase with regard to
that which you propose to use in other cases.
LORD CURZON: I have used the same phrase more than once all the wcv
through. You would add then that “ the French should not be permitted to fortify
Alexandretta.”
LORD ROBERT CECIL: My conception of the whole thing is utterly incon
sistent with the French being allowed to fortify any of these places.
LORD CURZON: Yes, and that is in my mind also. But how would you state
it ? I think it is worth while putting it down, if it is not in the Sykes-Picot
Agreement.
MR. BALFOLTR: “ It being understood that predominance does not carry with
it the right to fortify ”—will that do?
GENERAL MACDONOGH: With, regard to “political predominance,” in
the paper we have just approved as to the Caucasus, it is suggested that perhaps
America might be the protecting Power of Armenia. If America is the protecting
Power of Armenia, she would be the protecting Power of Cilicia. In that case, the
whole Bay of Iskanderun could not very well be under French* political predominance.
LORD CURZON: The American base for Cilicia or Armenia would be
Mersina. I have assumed all through, and I think Mr. Balfour has told us, that
with this unhappy Sykes-Picot Agreement round our necks under no conditions
would it be possible to persuade the French to give up Alexandretta.
GENERAL MACDONOGH: In the Paper I put before the War Cabinet on
the 28th October I suggested that the limit of French predominance should be from
Payas to Arsus. That only gives them the eastern shore of the Gulf of Iskanderun,
and the remainder of the Gulf of Iskanderun would naturally fall to the Power
protecting Armenia.
LORD CURZON: When I said “the Bay of Iskanderun,” I did not mean to
include every shore of it; I meant the eastern side.
GENERAL MACDONOGH: Ought not that to be stated? Otherwise it
would include the west shore of the Gulf.
GENERAL SMUTS: Strike out “ in the Bay of Iskanderun.”
LORD CURZON: Yes, we will strike that out because it is too indefinite.
MR. BALFOUR: If you add the words, “and in Cilicia,” that carries with it
the west.
GENERAL MACDONOGH: That is what 1 am drawing attention to. As
stated it is rather too strong, “ the Bay of Iskanderun and in Cilicia,” because it
is conceivable America might be responsible for Armenia, and therefore Cilicia.
LORD CURZON: Why not strike out Cilicia altogether, because it has been
dealt with by the resolutions we have passed with regard to Armenia? Why not
confine it to Alexandretta? “We should support the French claims to political
predominance in Alexandretta,” and then take Mr. Balfour’s words, “it being
understood,” and so on.
LORD ROBERT CECIL: I would like to put Mr. Balfour’s words at the end
of resolution 6: “In accordance with the Anglo-French Declaration of November