Papers of the War Cabinet's Eastern Committee [‎207r] (413/544)

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Tiflis, and we are already in occupation of Baku. Whatever we may say, there is
absolutely no alternative to the troops remaining there, at any rate for a time, tfou
ask me to fix the period, and I reply that I cannot undertake to do so. When you
state that my definition is “ until those States are able to stand of themselves,” I do
not accept that. I hope the occupation will be provisional; but it is in existence, and
for the moment we cannot withdraw. Whatever resolution is arrived at at this
table or at the Conference, we cannot take those troops away immediately any more
than we can take them away from other places in which we are involved. It is Mur
mansk one day, Siberia another. You cannot take them away and have everybody
cutting everybody else’s throat.
MR. MONTAGU : Why not? With very great respect I suggest it is possible
to take them away. That is my view. It may be wrong-headed and obstinate, but
that is what I think. In Transcaspia the sooner our troops are away the better.
LORD CURZON: I do not dissent from that.
LORD ROBERT CECIL: May I suggest this? I am of the same opinion as Mr.
Montagu. I would not really quarrel if I could strike out one sentence: “ The selec
tion of France would on broad grounds of policy and strategy be undesirable.” I
think that is putting it too high, personally. Then I should like to alter “ would ”
into “ might.”
LORD CURZON: I do not mind the last Suggestion in the least. But as to
your other point, the broad grounds of strategy were argued by the General Staff,
and both General Wilson and General Macdonogh stated the case in very strong
terms. On grounds of policy I hold the same view : I cannot exaggerate the degree
of anxiety I should feel if France, whose ambitions are already beginning to be
divulged, as you have seen in the telegrams—she is talking about the six vilayets,
the Black Sea, and Armenia, and we shall presently have the Caucasus thrown in too
—received any encouragement from us. I am looking to twenty, thirty, or fifty
years hence.
LORD ROBERT CECIL: You may be right, although I do not agree with
you. I said everything I have to say on the subject last time. I do not quarrel
with the propasition that the selection of America would be preferable to that of
France. I should really like to stop there, and then go on and simply say, “ Only
in the last resort, and reluctantly if pressed to do so, would Great Britain provision
ally accept the task.” I do not think it is any use repeating what I have said before,
but I was not convinced any more than Mr. Montagu was.
MR. BALFOUR: May I start a new fiare, although a very relevant one, and
one we have discussed over and over again ? What is the difficulty ? The difficulty
is that we do not much want anybody else there, and we do not want to find the troops
for carrying out what may be a long and very difficult operation. Why do we want
all these troops ? Is it merely to keep the railway line, to prevent Baku falling into
the hands of the Daghestan people, to prevent Batum being useless as a port and to
protect the pipe-line and railway between the two places? If that is the only thing
required I should have thought the number of troops necessary for policing purposes
would not be great. But if, on the other hand, you are going to reduce Daghestan to
order, which I think it was alleged in one of the papers before us took Russia a
hundred years to do, if you are going to police all the mountainous parts of Azer
baijan, and perhaps of Georgia if Georgia falls into disorder, then I dare say you
will require a large number of troops. I feel much disposed to say with Mr.
Montagu, as regards those things, if they want to cut their own throats why do we
not let them do it. I speak in the presence of the India Office The department of the British Government to which the Government of India reported between 1858 and 1947. The successor to the Court of Directors. here, but as I under
stand it we do let the tribes on the North-W T est Frontier, outside our own frontier,
cut each other’s throats in moderation. We make expeditions, as I understand, of a
punitive character when they attack us, but when they merely attack each other we
leave them alone. We do not try to introduce good order there. We say, “ You
must live in your tribal system, provided you do not become too great a nuisance to
your neighbours.” That is the way I should be inclined to treat these nations. I
should say we are not going to spend all our money and men in civilising a few
people who do not want to be civilised. We will protect Batum, Baku, the railway
between them, and the pipe-line. If that was our policy I do not think it would
require this immoderate strain upon our resources which frightens Mr. Montagu,
Lord Robert Cecil, and Lord Curzon too. It certainly frightens me.