Papers of the War Cabinet's Eastern Committee [‎199r] (397/544)

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agree we should have to keep more troops there. I will only add that there is still the
possibility, if you think k ranee is such a frightful danger, and if you conceive there are
certain objections to our adding to our responsibilities, of a neutral activity on behalf of
the League of Nations, as was suggested by (reneral Cox at the last meeting.
LORD CURZON : I hat idea did not receive much support, because it was thought
that a small nation would be lacking in the requisite force and moral prestige. I do not
want to go on arguing about France. But 1 have a very forcible recollection of the
old days in the foreign Office and of the trouble that France caused us in Siam, which was
thousands of miles from f ranee. All that is being said of France in the Caucasus now
could have been said of kranee in Siam then. Not only had we great trouble with
Fiance but we were within a snap of the fingers of war with her in Lord Rosebery’s
da y- If y° u I iav e a friendly b ranee there is no danger, but if you have, as one day you
may, a hostile France, why add to her power of offence?
LORD ROBERT CECIL : The point is simple. It may be a bad point or a good one,
but io is a ‘ample one. Everybody being agreed that the best possible thing would be
an independent set of lepublics, and it being further agreed that somebody would have
to keep order there, the question really is whether it is better for us that we should do
it or that somebody else should do it. The idea that it is of advantage to us to keep
order there is fantastic. It is clear that it will be a burden to us to keep order there
if we have to keep a force there, and a burden which I do not believe any future House
of Commons would listen to for a moment. If it really meant keeping a considerable
force there they would not listen to it. They never would agree to do that, 1 feel sure.
That is the real point, as it seems to me. I agree there is a possibility that a combina
tion between kiance and Russia here might cause us considerable military difficulties.
I cannot think, even so, that General Wilson has satisfied me that the fact that we
have a small force in occupation here would really materially diminish our difficulties.
^ If you conceive a regenerated hussia and a militarised Armenia, I cannot think that
. our position would be tolerable militarily in Georgia, and we should have to go out.
GENERAL WILSON : I agree, but that was not what we were thinking: of.
LORD ROBERI CECIL : If Russia is not there, then I cannot conceive that
France by herself would ever wish in any conceivable circumstances to attack England.
Of course it is possible to imagine anything, such as a new Napoleon, but, short of that,
I cannot conceive France wishing: to do so.
LORD CURZON : The point is that she might make herself disagreeable, rather
than attack. She could put on pressure which might be dangerous and bring us to the
verge of war.
LORD ROBERT CECIL: If we occupy this region w^e should occupv Trans-Caspia,
I suppose. - . . 2 ,
LORD CURZON : 1 hope not. We are talking only of staying in the Caucasus
to set the people on their legs there.
LORD ROBERT CECIL: You ought not to he taken in by that phrase. We
get there so often, and we always remain.
LORD CURZON: The condition of affairs is different now. You might as well
apgue against all the Powers who are going to be charged with this burden all over the
world. Are you going to lay down the proposition that everybody is going to remain ?
Most of them will be anxious to get out, whether it is America or France.
? GENERAL W ILSON : If Lord Robert Cecil can form the League of Nations
LORI) ROBERI CECIL : Then we need not trouble about it.
MR. BALFOUR : That is my view. Why bother now ?
LORD ROBERT CECIL: Nobody will be anxious to be the mandatory undei
the League of Nations.
GENERAL WILSON : We want to know what we are to do. This is the
telegram- to which I have to send a re-ply :f “It would be of the greatest assistance
if I could be informed of the general lines which the policy to be adopted in the
the Caucasus will follow, in view of the early departure of troops to occupy Batum
and of the extension of ?ny command to Baku and Krasnovodsk. J am referring not
to the lurks but to the Russian, Armenian, Persian, and Tartar inhabitants.”
* K.C. 2t;i2. t K.C. 2709.