Papers of the War Cabinet's Eastern Committee [‎198r] (395/544)

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Caucasia, which is far safer now, from the Indian point of view, than it ever was,
because b is either goin^ to be occupied by the French, whom T think we can manage,
or bv these little nations themselves. It is not ooing to be occupied by Russia, which
was the military Power you had to fear. I would not commit this country to military
action under necessities which have not yet arisen, and which I most earnestly trust
never will arise. —
LORD CURZON : May I break a lance on behalf of the military authorities, with
regard to your strictures in the case of India ? You wiil remember very well that when
the Anglo-Russian Agreement about Persia was being drawn up, the military necessities
of India were drawn so narrow that when it came to a question of the division of Persia
into zones, on Lord Kitchener’s advice the military zone required for the protection of
India was limited to a little strip on the east of Persia, from the Afghan border on the
north to the Gulf in the south. Lord Kitchener said : “ Do not take more than that;
it is all that is required for the defence of India.” The result of this war has proved
that he was absolutely wrong, and that the defence of India, so far from being confined
to that narrow corner, has spread out to Hamadan, Tehran, Resht, and right away to
Baku. We have been holding the line of Hamadan to the Caspian not in the least
from any desire of our own—you will bear me out that I struggled against it as much
as anyone—but it was imposed upon us in the interests of India’s defence. Perhaps
this is rather an academic point to take, but I can well conceive that just as the defence
of India has driven us forward in this war to the line from Hamadan to the Caspian,
so in the future it may do the same with the Caucasus. Unintentionally, no doubt,
are you not rather misrepresenting the views of the General Staff by the expressions you
have used ? I loathe the idea of permanent military occupation of the Caucasus. I cannot
contemplate it, because we have not the men to do it. I am anxious to set up a new
condition of affairs in that part of the country, and to give the people a chqnce. We
are there for the time being, and we may be asked to stay on. I contemplate this, that
when we go to the Peace Conference, the future of all these countries will be under
examination. If the position of the League of Nations is to be assured, the Powers will
very likely be called upon to say, “ Here are all these national communities; the world
is in commotion, and if affairs are to settle down the Great Powers must be put in
charge here and there.” They may say, “ France, will you take charge of Armenia?
America, will you take charge of Constantinople, or whatever it may be? Next comes
the Caucasus: who is to look after the Caucasus ? ” I think by the process of
exhaustion, if by no other means, it must come to us, because nobody else has any
interest there in the future, unless it be an aggressive interest. In the last resort they
they will come and say, “ You are already there ; we want you to stay ; take charge of
these people, and set them on their legs. - ’ I do not think anything will alter the fact
that somebody must be there ; and, if so, I do not see why we should wring our hands,
our interests being so closely involved, and propose anybody but ourselves. Are we so
unsuspicious that we are prepared to let the French, the most imperialistic people in
world
LORD ROBERT CECIL: That is not the point at all. The real point we can
see from the map, although it does not include the whole of it. We have got to taka
over the w r hole of the Arab bit of country (Areas A and B) undoubtedly. The
argument will^be, we have struggled against it and tried to see whether we could get out
of it. We have got to take tbe whole of the Arab country, and the whole of Arabia.
We have a very awkward political situation, as is known, in connection with our
agreements with France. If w r e can say, “ Very well, France can have Armenia, and,
as far as we are concerned, she can have the Caucasus Republics,” they are not much
catch. Ehe can be mandatory if she desires it, she can be put in charge of the
Caucasus.
MR. BALFOUR : Why should there be a mandatory ?
LORD ROBERT CECIL : I am assuming Lord Curzon’s point that there must be.
MR. BALFOUR : He may be right, I quite agree, though I am not prepared to
admit it without argument. Of course the Caucasus would be much better governed
under our aegis than it would be under French aegis. But why should it not be
misgoverned ?
LORD CURZON:
throats.
That is the other alternative—let them cut each other’s