Papers of the War Cabinet's Eastern Committee [‎197r] (393/544)

11
I 1
LORD ROBERT CECIL : We did not go in to administer the country, i^ord
Cromer never had any position there at all; he was merely the adviser of the Egyptian
Government. Gradually lie had to take over the administration because they were so
incompetent, and the same thing will happen again in Georgia and elsewhere.
LORD CURZON : As to the Georgians, or indeed any of these States, that is not
my idea at all. Mr. Montagu has spoken as if I contemplated a formidable and
prolonged military occupation. Let us look at things as they are. You have opened
up the Black Sea route to Batum ; you have sent a division to Batum, and you are
going to send another if it is wanted ; you have forces at the present moment at Baku ;
you will have presently, if you have not already, forces at Tiflis. When do you propose
to take them away ? Do you think you will be able to take them away in one, two,
three, or six months ? Nothing of the sort. You will not be able to. You will have
to keep them there for a period of time.
MR. MONTAGU : I do not think you will be allowed to take them away.
LORD CURZON: I should take them away as soon as I could. But I think the
people will say “ While we are setting up these States of our own we shall want a
certain number of troops.”
LORD ROBERT CECIL : Two divisions, and in another ten years they will want
three.
LORD CURZON : Stevens, who is rather a Jingo in the matter, says the total
number of troops, under his extreme hypothesis, to hold the line would be 10,000.
LORD ROBERT CECIL: We were told that we could occupy Siberia with
20 , 000 .
GENERAL WILSON : What is the meaning of this, which was signed by Lord
Robert Cecil in December 1917 : “‘ The English zone was the Cossack territory, the
territories of the Caucasus, Armenia, Georgia, Kurdistan. The French zone was
Bessarabia, the Ukraine, the Crimea ” ?
LORD ROBERT CECIL : The meaning of it is simple. The question was, who
was to assist the various Russian loyalist forces in the south of Russia. There was a
great danger that the French were sending money to one set of people and we were
sending money at the same time, and we said that we must have a division. Therefore
the convenient division was that we should take these parts, which were more easy for
us to get at, and those parts more easy for the French. If that was the point, if we
were in a position to offer the Ukraine to France, there would be a great deal in that
policy still. But if we are to take the whole of the Caucasus areas, that would be a
profound imperialistic policy, and is quite out of the question now.
MR. MONTAGU : You were then dealing with war conditions.
LORD ROBERT CECIL : Yes, merely for the purpose of assisting the various
elements we were then assisting against the Bolshevik elements. It was merely to keep
up the Eastern front.
GENERAL MACDONOGII : Is not the question this: What is the value of
Caucasia to us? Do we or do we not want it? Is it an important link of the
communication with India, or is it not ? Would we be willing to see any foreign Power
there except the natives? Lord Robert Cecil suggests that the French are not going
to raise a great army of natives and then attack Georgia. I do not know if they will
or not ; perhaps they will. If that should happen, why would the French be attacking
Georgia and Azerbaijan ? With only one object—to get to the Caspian. And surely,
if you have the French coming out of these six vilayets and attempting to strike at the
Caspian, we should have to be prepared in any case, whether occupying Georgia or pot,
to resist them, for it would simply mean that they were attacking our communications
with India.
LORD CURZON : In this controversy, which side do you take ?
GENERAL MACDONOGH: 1 entirely agree with the General Staff and with
yourself in thinking that the mandatory Power ought to be Great Britain in the case
of the Caucasus.
MR. BALFOUR: I am against a mandatory Power, and against Great Britain
taking it, although we may be driven to it. It would be a most serious thing. I am