Papers of the War Cabinet's Eastern Committee [‎193v] (386/544)

4
MIDDLE EASTERN QUESTIONS WITH REFERENCE TO THE
PEACE CONFERENCE.
The second question I want to raise is this. We are taking the whole Held of this
Committee in geographical sections; Mesopotamia first, the Caucasus and Armenia
second, Syria and Palestine after, and we treat each area, as it seems to me,
according to the almost irrefutable and unanswerable arguments addressed to us by
our Chairman. With the assent of the Committee we seem to be drifting into the
position that right from the east to the west there is only one possible solution of all
our difficulties, namely, that Great Britain should accept responsibility for all these
countries. For some reason, France is objectionable here ; for other reasons, America
is objectionable there, snud the only solution is that we should be the tutelary Power, the
protecting Power, or whatever the adjective is, although we are agreed that theie
should be no annexation. I am a little alarmed—I do not know whether it is avoidable
at the possible relationship with our American associates over a situation which I
cannot help thinking they will view with some suspicion. I was wondering it, when
when we have completed the investigation of each area, we shall have an opportunity
of surveying our recommendations as a whole and see it we cannot approach our Allies in a
sustainable position, or whether we shall not find ourselves in a position in wInch we
have firmly convinced ourselves that all alternatives are objectionable, and that unfortu
nately, against our will, British responsibilities, with their concomitant military
responsibilities, have got to be increased to embrace the whole areas discussed by this
Committee. I do not know whether anyone has said anything as to this danger, but
I think it ought to be present to our mind.
LORD CURZON : I do not think anybody has put it as clearly as that.
Mr. Montagu has, I think, a little exaggerated the situation, because, so far from claiming
it as our desire to become the mandatory or tutelary Power ot these regions, in some
cases we cannot possibly escape it, and as to others, we have gone so far as to say that
we would gladly accept any foreign Power of the first order, so long as we are not
ourselves involved and thus incur the very suspicions which Mr. Montagu fears. For
instance, when we discussed Armenia and Caucasia, a very strong feeling was expressed
here that it would be well, both on grounds of broad policy and also on the narrow
ground of expediency, to interest France in Armenia. I think at the present moment
the proposition is that these tutelary powers should be exercised by k ranee in the case
of Armenia, and preference was expressed at this table for a larger rather than a smaller
Armenia to be handed over to France. Then when we come to the C aucasus, it was
only by what Mr. Montagu calls the irrefutable processes of logic that we gradually
came to the conclusion that, willing as we were to take k ranee, and even more
so America, the larger political and strategical considerations to which the Chief
of the Imperial General Staff has drawn attention must drive us to another
conclusion. Even if we do arrive at that conclusion, surely behind it all lies
the double protection, first, of the principle of self-determination upon which
we have relied and upon which we are quite content to rely ; secondly, the possibility
of a League of Nations which should itself ask us to act as the mandatory, therefore,
so far from contemplating that we should appear at the Peace Conference, or anywhere,
with proposals that Great Britain should do this or that, I think, on the contrary, that
we ought to start in the other way and trust to the inevitable process of events and the
unanswerable logic of the situation to prove that, in the last resort, we shall be bound
to assume certain responsibilities. As regards the question with which Mr. Montagu
concluded, and which I thought a very fair one, when we have gone through all these
countries 1 hope we shall then have a meeting and see the position into which we are
drifting, and measure the degrees of responsibility which, even if we are not intentionally
assuming it, may be forced upon us, and come to a definite conclusion as to whether or
not the burden is really too heavy. I quite agree to that, and when we have gone
through all the subjects we will have regard to the point Mr. Montagu has raised.
LORD ROBERT CECIL: May I add a word ? If the objects of General Smuts
materialise, and I hope they will, the League of Nations will not only be the dominant
factor in all these situations, but it will probably lay down as a principle that no
occupation of any of these countries must be of advantage to the occupying country.
When I say “ occupation ^ I mean to include all the minor degrees of “ sphere of
influence,” and so on. The “ open door ” will have to be an essential principle of all
countries under the control of the League of Nations. If that is established, 1 doubt if
France will be so keen as she was.