Papers of the War Cabinet's Eastern Committee [‎187v] (374/544)

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LORD CURZON : That is military co-operation, is it not ?
LORD ROBERT CECIL : This was in order to get them.
GENERAL WILSON : The co-operation of the Arabs is secured.
LORD ROBERT CECIL : Yes, they have co-operated with us.
GENERAL SMUTS: That means military co-operation. It does not mean
consent.
LORD ROBERT CECIL: The object then was this. We were very anxious to
get the Hussein kingdom on its legs and to get the co-operation of the Arabs, which
was thought to be important. That was the object of it.
GENERAL WILSON : It does not say so.
LORD ROBERT CECIL: I think it meant that.
GENERAL MACDONOGH : What bearing has the Sykes-Picot Agreement upon
the military co-operation of the Arabs ?
LORD ROBERT CECIL : It was the other way. They said, “We make the
agreement, but you must understand we make it subject to this, that if we find it
utterly destroys the co-operation of the Arabs we shall have to reconsider our position.
Then Sykes and Picot did go down to King Hussein, and thought they conveyed to
King Hussein the terms of the Agreement. King Hussein now loudly declares he was
never told anything about it, and that is one of his great grievances, of course. He
says he never understood the Agreement at all.
LORD CURZON : I think your interpretation is quite clearly the right one, if
you read the sentence as a whole : “ They are ready ” — that is, His Majesty’s Govern
ment—“ to accept the arrangement now arrived at, provided that the co-operation of
the Arabs is secured, and that the Arabs fulfil the conditions and obtain the towns of
Homs, Hama, Damascus, and Aleppo.” Clearly the reference must be to military
co-operation, because the form which it was expected to take is stated, and the exact
military fulfilment of the conditions is laid down in terms. If the subsequent
co-operation of the Arabs was alluded to, i.e., the subsequent acceptance of the
agreement, the sentence would surely have come second and not first. I think you must
read the phrase “co-operation of the Arabs” in the light of the sentence that follows,
which defines its meaning. Mr. Balfour, before you go may I say this : In the course
of my examination I have been sketching out the way in which things will ■'frork out if
we cannot get rid of the Sykes-Picot Agreement. If we are held to our bargain with the
French, if the feelings of the French are as described by Lord Robert Cecil and
M. Cajnbon, we seem to be very near to something like a partition of the Syrian coast—
a Palestinian area, a French area, an Arab area or a Syrian area ; again a French area,
and possibly an Armenian area in the north. Is that a situation you would look
forward to with any equanimity ? Let me put it in another way. Do you think we
can isolate the French in the Lebanon, give them that, and say “We do not want a
dispute about this ; you have a majority there, you have sentimental and other interests
there, by all means, but we must try and englobe you, so to speak, in Syrian and Arab
spheres, and prevent you from going too far or becoming too mischievous ? ”
MR. BALFOUR : Perhaps I may answer your question by asking another : Are
you afraid, by giving the French a fragment of this coast, that you give them a
jumping-off ground for far oriental ambitions ?
LORD CURZON : No, not the least. The way I am looking at it is this, from
the point of view of the Arabs. It seems to me perfectly absurd to set up an Arab
State under Faisal at Damascus, and to say to him : “ My dear fellow, here you are,
do what you like in this region ; but we are bound to block you out, by the Sykes-Picot
Agreement, from the sea, Tripoli, and Latakia.” That is an inconceivable position to
put him in. The only other alternative is to let him have the railway from Tripoli
to Homs.
MR. BALFOUR : We have commercial rights which, no doubt, might be extended
to other nations through Alexandretta, and we have rights through a port in
Palestine.
LORD CURZON : Haifa; yes.