Papers of the War Cabinet's Eastern Committee [‎186v] (372/544)

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* E.C. 1915.
t E.C. 2044.
LORD ROBERT CECIL : May I say a few words in addition to what Mr. Balfour
has said. I agree with all Mr. Balfour has said. I have, as Lord Curzon knows,
sustained feebly the same point of view more or less on various occasions. As to the
Sykes-Picot Agreement, I understand—though I had nothing to do with it, and did not
know of its existence until after it was made—it was made in connection with the
French attitude towards the Egyptian campaign—exactly what it was I do not know.
When the Egyptian campaign began the French said* “ What do you really mean about
your movement towards Palestine ? We want to know what you really mean.” Then
the Sykes-Picot Agreement was come to in order to satisfy them that what we did mean,
if we succeeded
LORD CURZON : Was it not the result of an investigation conducted in the
Foreign Office under the chairmanship of Lord Carnock ?
LORD ROBERT CECIL : Yes.
GENERAL MACDONOGH : I am sorry to say that I am the only person present i
who was a member of that Committee. The Sykes-Picot Agreement was being drafted
when 1 came to the War Office in January 1916, I think. I only attended one meeting,
about the 18th January. The Chairman of the Committee was Lord Carnock. There
was Sir Mark Sykes, Picot, myself, I think Admiral Hall, and one or two others whom *
I forget. I remember protesting against the Agreement at the time, but it was
certainly made, as Lord Robert Cecil says, in order to try and prevent the great
jealousy of the French as to our action in Egypt. I remember Lord Carnock mentioning
that at the time.
LORD ROBERT CECIL: That is right, and therefore it does come within
Mr. Balfour’s principle, that it was an agreement made for a definite war purpose, and I
entirely agree that we cannot go back on it in the least forcibly. We might try and
persuade the French to let us off, but that is all we can do. In considering that I think
we have got those factors in our favour. There is the declaration winch has been
referred to, there is the letter' ::: ' to M. Pichon, in which we proposed a reconsideration of
the Sykes-Picot Agreement on the ground that it was out of date, to which they
assented,f although afterwards they have withdrawn, or have tried to withdraw, their
assent; but they assented, and we took note of their assent. Therefore they cannot
go back upon that. That brings in the Americans to discuss the Agreement. We are
not doing anything dishonest in discussing the merits of the Agreement with the
Americans, and if the French and Italians have that idea we can say in the last resort, if
the French insist, we cannot go back upon our signature. I think we are entitled to do
that with regard to that letter. Then I should like to say this. I am a little afraid of
pressing self-determination, quite apart from treaty obligations, too far. It is not very
easy to apply, for instance, in this case. We are told that the Uniates, certain districts
round Beirut, want the French. If you are going to press the thing too far you are in a
difficulty already, and [ have a kind of conviction that a lot of other people will turn out
to want the French, and the French will in a little time organise those parts.
That is one thing. It puts a premium on intrigue if you press it too far. The other
general observation I want to make is this. 1 think it would be an awful mistake if
we think we can get rid of the French out of Syria. I know that Colonel Lawrence
will not approve of that observation, but I am quite sure you will never get the French
to give up the whole of Syria without the most tremendous convulsion. They would
rather give up anything in the world than give up that claim to Syria; they are mad
about it, and Gambon himself is quite insane if you suggest it. I am sure you will
never get them out of Syria, and we ought to make up our mind to go for some settle
ment which will give them some position in Syria, however unpleasant it may be to
have them there. You must give them Beirut and a bit of the Lebanon at any rate.
I do not think you can do less than that myself.
I should like to say here that I prefer General Smuts’ League of Nations’ position
to the pure self-determination position.
* MR. BALFOUR: Would not that rather depend upon the character of the
populations you w r ere dealing with ?
LORD ROBERT CECIL: Yes. What I mean is this : Self-determination should
be an indication, but you must not tie yourself to it pedantically. It would be a good
indication for a League of Nations’ body to work on. But in territories of this kind
we should not attempt to leave it to the populations to say, because you would have