Papers of the War Cabinet's Eastern Committee [‎184r] (367/544)

* E.C. 2136a.
7
it to-day, whether the terms of that Agreement—by which we and the other Powers
are still bound—are compatiole with the rights in the blue area which were conceded to
France under the Sykes-Picot Agreement of 1916. My own view is that, strictly
speaking, they are not. One clause in the Sykes-Picot Agreement irave France a right
to establish such administration, direct or indirect, or such control, as she might desire
and might find suitable to establish in the blue area, after agreement with the Arab
State or Confederation ; and I do find some little difficulty—which may emerge as a not
altogether useless argument later on—in reconciling those promises with the earlier
engagements of the reglement orqanique of the Lebanon.
The next specific Agreement was the Sykes-Picot Agreement of May 1916, and
here—because it is vital that we should bear it in mind at every stage of this examination
of the Syrian question —let me once again remind the Committee of what that did. It
gave to France powers of direct or indirect administration or control in the blue area,
south of a line drawn, I think, from Alexandretta to Killis, that is to say, south of the
borders of Cilicia to a southern boundary somewhere north of Acre, runping through the
Sea of Galilee to the east side of the Jordan. This blue area, in relation to the problem
we are examining to-day, includes Alexandretta, Antioch, the ports of Latakia and
Tripoli, and the railway running from Tripoli nearly to Homs ; it includes Beirut,
Baalbek, and the railway running from Beirut nearly to Damascus, Sidon, Tyre, and
Banias, on the northern confines of the old Palestine, which, on the Turkish maps is
marked as Huleh, the Scriptural Dan. So much for the blue area.
In area (A) France is given priority of enterprise and loans, and the exclusive
right to supply such advisers or functionaries as may be required by the Arab State.
In this area are found Aleppo, Hama, Homs, Damascus, as well as the regions of the
Upper Faiphrates and the Upper Tigris ; at the same time France is pledged by the
engagements to which I have already referred to recognise and uphold within this area
an independent Arab State or Confederacy under the suzerainty of an Arab chief.
The third specific declaration is the Anglo-French declaration 5 ' of the 9th November,
1918, the full importance of which I sometimes think we have not sufficiently realised
in this room. This applies both to the blue area and to the red area, or Mesopotamia,
and also to A and B. In this declaration France and Great Britain pledged themselves
to encourage and assist and, in due time, to recognise the establishment of native
Governments in those regions which are generally described as Syria and Mesopotamia
in the declaration ; secondly, not to impose any particular institutions upon them ;
thirdly, to give support and efficacious assistance to the normal working of these native
institutions when set up. These phrases, as you will observe, are, and could hardly
be otherwise than, vague. They are incompatible, of course, with the setting up of any
French Government or British Government in any of the areas affected, and a fortiori
are even more incompatible with annexation. But they are compatible—and here a
difficulty will probably arise - with the appointment of French or British functionaries,
as the case may be, as provided for in the Sykes-Picot Agreement. Still, although
disputes may arise about form and words, in substance that declaration of the 9th
November, 1918, does to a large extent supersede the Sykes-kicot Agreement, and
when w r e are counting up the various weapons we have in our hands for dealing with
the Sykes-Picot Agreement later on, 1 think we shall find ourselves laying very great
stress upon the general spirit, if not upon the actual terms, of the declaration to which
I refer.
LORD ROBERT CECIL : That, of course, was its object.
LORD CURZON : Yes, so much for the commitments by which we are bound.
Now let me take the facts of the case as they have emerged during the history of
the last two years. When the Sykes-Picot Agreement was drawn up it was, no
doubt, intended by its authors, of whom 1 was not one (and I do not think any of us in
this room had very much to do with it), as a sort of fancy sketch to suit a situation that
had not then arisen, and which it was thought extremely unlikely would ever arise ;
and that, 1 suppose, must be the principal explanation of the gross ignorance with
which tho boundary lii es in that Agreement were drawn. Let me give in passing
only three illustrations of the extent to winch that Agreement, in relation to Syria at
any rate, is not only obsolete, but absolutely impracticable. First, as we pointed
out at our meeting a week ago, it brings the French sphere right up to Mosul and
the Upper Tigris, and far into Kurdistan lying beyond; secondly, it splits up the
Arabs in the areas A and B by a most fantastic and incredible line of division ; and,