Papers of the War Cabinet's Eastern Committee [‎176r] (351/544)

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Russia fought long to overcome Daghestan, so she would probably have to fight long-
if she ever recovers—in order to get it back. hor the moment, the Republic o
Daghestan has an independent though not a very seeme existence.
Then on the southern side you have the little province of which I sp->ke, Russian
Armenia, with its capital at Erivan. I do not propose to say anything about that,
because whatever is the fate of large Armenia it will carry with it the fate of the
smaller, and the Russian Armenians will either remain where they are or will gravitate
westwards to join their brethren. In any case, I imagine that Russian Armenia will
form a part of the larger Armenia which it is proposed to ere te.
The really embarrassing factor of this problem is Azerbaijan, whether you call it
Turkish Azerbaijan, because it is inhabited by Turks or Tatars, or Russian Azerbaijan,
because it belonged until recently to the Russian Empire. This includes Baku and
Elizabethpol. These are the two principal cities. The difficulty about the Government
of Azerbaijan at the moment is this, that it is violently pro-lurk, violently anti-
Armenian, violently anti-Persian,—in fact, it is everything we do not want it to be.
The Government is in the hands of the Tatar land-owners, who hate the Armenians
with a deadly hatred, hate the Bolsheviks equally well, and who, for racial and selfish
reasons, incline towards the Turks. The aspirations of this small State of Azerbaijan
are for recognition, which we have never yet given, and for expansion to the South.
They want to join themselves with their brethren across the border in Persia, and to
make a Turkish State in that part of the world. Now what are our desires with regard^
to Azerbaijan, both north and south of the Persian frontier? That problem is one of
the most acute that we have to deal with, because while I imagine on general grounds
we should welcome the constitution of some sort of State there, provjdt-d it were not a
menace to ourselves, the only form that State seems likely to assume in the near future
is one which we could not look upon with any satisfaction.
These are the four States creeping into existence in that part of the world. \\ hat is to
be their future ? A great deal turns upon whether we are to contemplate that at any
time in the future they will go back to Russia or not. Russia has spent millions of
money and 60 or 70 years of fighting in order to get them. Will she abandon that
quest altogether? Is it possible that a reconstituted Russia of the future will once
again get the Caucusus under her sway ? I cannot answer that question ; and in all
probability what we ought to do, without forming any opinion upon it at all, is to
refrain from taking any step that would prevent a resuscitated Russia from resuming
her connection with that part of the world. But for the time being it is clear, from all
the information we have, that these rising Republics aie furiously anti-Russian and
furiously anti-Bolshevik, and we ought to do nothing whatever to lead them to suppose
that we are ignoring their claims to independence in favour of a possible revival of
Russia in the future.
The second question is, are we to recognise them? Upon that, no doubt, the
Foreign Office will advise us. With regard to Georgia the answer seems to be
inevitably in the affirmative ; with regard to Daghestan, probably ; with regard to
Russian Armenia I speak with hesitation, and, indeed, it is not necessary to give an
answer, because it is part of the larger question. As to Azerbaijan, under the
circumstances it is most difficult to say yes. On the other hand, it is not easy to say no.
Out of this welter can we evolve anything in the way of a policy for ourselves at the
Peace Conference ? I suppose it must take two lines. As to "the tuteluy Power of
which we were speaking just now, Lord Robert Cecil was telling us that he looked upon
it as out of the question that the Americans would undertake this burden. If that is
so, the French remain. The strongest argument in favonr of bringing the French into
it is that it fits in with our Syrian policy; we want to divert the energies of France
away from the Lebanon and Arabia. First, will the French assume responsibilities in
the Caucasus ? Secondly, are they the best people to do it? Ihirdlv, is it to our
interest to set up a powerful French State or authority in that part of the world?
Those are questions I do not at'empt to answer ; but it does occur to me that,
whatever may be settled about the tutelary Power, our interest, and, indeed, the
interest of everyone concerned in this region, compels us to take steps quite apart from
the question of the recognition of this or that State. I have spoken of the importance
of Batum at one end of the line and Baku at the other. I should think this Committee
will probably agree that, whatever happens, Batum must be made a free port. It was
a free port, under the Treaty of Berlin, until it "as shamelessly annexed by Russia
contrary to the provisions of that Act. I imagine, too, that we ought to ensure complete
control of the railway from Batum to Baku. I imagine that Baku ought to be inter
nationalised and put under some form of government more secure than any of the States
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