Papers of the War Cabinet's Eastern Committee [‎166v] (332/544)

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Governments in the liberated areas, and not to impose on the populations any
Government which they dislike. Subject to those two conditions we desire to
see in Mesopotamia the strongest and most settled Government possible, and we
are prepared to give all British assistance necessary for that end, including an
army of occupation. Doubtless, owing to the local conditions, and the absence
of any outstanding Arab personality, and of any class of persons qualified to
hold high offices, it will be necessary for some time to establish a very large
measure of British control, and foreign relations will be entirely under British
control. But there will be no annexation, and as far as can be seen at present
no formal protectorate. The position is more likely to be analogous to that of
Egypt before the war, minus the Capitulations. This does not differ materially
from proposals in Sir P. Cox’s memorandum of the 22nd April. Your adminis-
. trative action and official utterances should be guided by the above principles,
and you should be able to satisfy our friends that we are not going to leave them
in the lurch. Meanwhile, we are considering the best form of native govern
ment to set up, and should be glad to receive the advice and assistance of your
self and your advisers on this point. Communications to President Wilson
should not be allowed, but you may receive and report any addresses which
really representative bodies may wish to make to His Majesty’s Government in
favour of British control, or on any other point connected with the future
government of the country.”
That was the rough draft before this discussion. I was going to suggest that a
telegram of that kind might still be sent, with the concrete suggestion that we are
anxious to meet the wishes of the Arab population as regards the personnel of the
Government, and that he, Miss Bell, and anybody else he might suggest, ought to
conduct an enquiry and report as soon as possible.
LORD CURZON: I think you will have to put to him the direct questions.
The questions we want to ask are these:—
(1.) Do they want a single Arab State from Mosul down to the Gulf?
It is vital to have an answer to that question. The answer will probably be in the
affirmative. I do not know that we are particularly concerned, but I should prefer
it to be in the alternative—Do the Arabs in all those areas want to be united in a
single Arab State from Mosul to the Gulf, under British tutelage?'
(2.) Admitting British tutelage as a necessity of the case, do they want an Arab
ruler to be set up as the titular head of the State?
(3.) If so, who is the man?
LORD ROBERT CECIL: It is a political necessity for us to have an Arab &
ruler, and I would suggest that they could get out of that because I suspect a great
deal of the educated opinion would prefer not to have an Arab ruler, but would
prefer to be under the direct administration of this country. I suspect they would
much prefer that, but for political reasons we cannot do that.
LORD CURZON: You think that local governments, councils, municipal and
otherwise, will not be enough for President Wilson, or perhaps King Hussein, or
for both?
LORD ROBERT CECIL: Yes, both. If President Wilson found Hussein,
whom he regarded as an Arab and as an authority on native opinion, against that,
it might make a great difficulty for us. I do not see the least objection to having as
a figurehead an Amir.
MR. MONTAGU: If you can get the right one. I should have thought that,
rather than have a wrong one, you would have bad an Arab Republic.
LORD CURZON: I think we are all agreed.
LORD ROBERT CECIL : Yes. They are only small details of procedure, and
anything vou settle I shall be satisfied with.
LORD CURZON: May we go on to the next branch of the case at another
meeting?
LORD ROBERT CECIL: Yes, certainly. What is there in the way?
LORD CURZON: We cannot do it in your absence.