Papers of the War Cabinet's Eastern Committee [‎161v] (322/544)

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* E.C. 173.
within the territories specified by Hussein in a previous communication. That was
practically all the Arab-inhabited territories from Mersina and Adana down to the
Persian Gulf The historical term used to describe the body of water between the Arabian Peninsula and Iran. . But, he added that “ for the vilayets of Baghda*d and Basra a special
measure of administrative control would be required to secure the country from
aggression, to promote the welfare of the local populations, and to safeguard our
mutual economic interests.” The Sherif replied on the 5th November, 1915, agreeing
to British administration of the Irak regions then occupied by British troops, for a
short time, subject to compensation. This claim was never admitted by us ; but, on
the other hand, was never withdrawn by him, and it is one which we must be pre-
pared at any time to see renewed.
Then I come to the third stage, that of the Sykes-Pioot Agreement of May 1916.
1 need not now go through the whole of the terms of that unfortunate Agreement,
which has been hanging like a millstone round our necks ever since. The points that
concern us to-day are these. That Agreement gave to France priority of enterprise
and local loans, as well as the appointment of advisers and public functionaries in
the area denominated “ A ” (corresponding to the British rights in area “B ”),
both of these areas to be included in a future Arab State. Observe that the French
area A includes Damascus, Homs, Aleppo, Palmyra, the whole of the Upper
Euphrates Valley down nearly to Ana, as well as the more northerly districts of
Ras-el-Ain, Nisibin, and Mosul, down toAltun Keupri. just north of Kirkuk. Bear
in mind that, under that Agreement, in area “ A ” the French have these rights, and
we have no corresponding rights there at all. I need not now discuss the further
and extensive rights of administration and control given to France by that Agree
ment in the Blue Zone, in Syria, nor what was said there about Palestine. We will
come to those topics later. Thus, in May 1916, we were bound hard and fast by this
deplorable Agreement, to which, as we know, the French seem disposed to adhere
most tenaciously.
The next stage, after the military operations in Mesopotamia!—to which I need
not refer, but which proved so successful—was this. After full discussion in this
Committee, or the Committee which preceded it. and after acceptance by the Cabinet,.
General Maude’s Proclamation was issued to the people of Baghdad on the 19th
March, 1917. In it we said : “ It is not the wish of the British Government to
impose upon you ”—that is, the people of Baghdad—“ alien institutions We
hope that you will flourish again under institutions in consonance with your sacred
laws and racial ideals We hope that the Arab race may rise once more to
greatness and; renown among the peoples of the earth We hope that you may
be united with your kinsmen in the north, east, south, and west, in realising the
aspirations of your race.” It is true that these general terms did seem to indicate,
and were intended to indicate, some sort of Confederation of Arab States in that
part of Arabia. This proclamation of General Maude was followed within ten days
by a telegram to the Government of India, in which we laid down the policy of His
Majesty’s Government on similar lines. This was the first stage at which the
Government here did definitely and precisely lay down their policy. At that time we
contemplated a difference of administrative arrangements between the vilayets of
Basra and Baghdad. We proposed that the Basra vilayet should remain permaneflitly
under British administration. We proposed that Baghdad should be made an Arab
State with local rulers or governors, but under a British protectorate in everything
but the name. The State should exhibit an Arab facade, and be administered as an
Arab province by an independent agency An office of the East India Company and, later, of the British Raj, headed by an agent. , in accordance with existing laws and
institutions. Thus we were still at that time in favour of something approximating
to the annexation of Basra, and involving very clearly a British protectorate over
Baghdad.
Then came the visit of Sir Percy Cox to this country, and the discussion of his
memorandum* of the 22nd April, 1918. You will observe that a year had elapsed
since the statement of policy made by us in March 1917. Sir Percy Cox, still pur
suing the policy then laid diown, put' his proposals before us. He proposed govern
ment by a High Commissioner, and in the discussion at the meetings of this Committee
he suggested that the High Commissioner might be assisted, if required, by a Cabinet,
half of natives and half of British officials, behind which might be an administrative
council, or some advisory body consisting entirely of prominent natives. We discussed
with him the question of a titular head of this Baghdad State. He expressed the
strongest opinion against acknowledging in any form the authority of the Sherif of
Mecca, King Hussein. He said. “ Let the Shetrif remain the guardian of the Holy
Places, and, if necessary to soothe his pride, pay him a subsidy from the revenues