Papers of the War Cabinet's Eastern Committee [‎155r] (309/544)

turned out. He thought it was doubtful whether there were any
large holders of money in Trans-Caspia. The main point was that
a large sum was involved, and the purpose for which it was required
was doubtful.
Mr. Montagu thought that we had once given some sort of
promise of assistance to the Askabad Government.
Mr. Keynes said that His Majesty’s Government had never
committed themselves in any way, but that apparently some rather
vague promises had been made Ity Malleson.
Mr. Montagu said that, however vague the promises were, they
had been made by our representative.
Lord Robert Cecil said that it was one thing to support Denekin,
whose assistance might be of very great value to us in Russia, and
another thing to endeavour to buttress such a rotten structure as the
Askabad Government.
The Chairman understood that our policy now was to support
the All-Russian Government at Omsk, which it was hoped would
establish connection hy means of the Orenburg Railway with
Tashkent, and ultimately squeeze out of Turkestan all the Bolshevik
elements there. This was one of our main reasons for staying on
for the present in Trans-Caspia.
General Cox was of opinion that we should maintain Malleson’s
Mission in Trans-Caspia until we were quite sure that the country
would not go to pieces. If there were any chance of the Govern
ment there drifting into chaos without our support he thought we
ought to maintain it.
Lord Robert Cecil asked whether it would matter very much,
so far as we are concerned, if Trans-Caspia did fall to pieces.
General Cox replied that it would probably react unfavourably
for us on the Persian and Afghanistan borders.
The Chairman agreed, and said this was the real answer to the
question why we were in Trans-Caspia. If anarchy were allowed
to break out there the Ameer of Afghanistan would hold us
responsible. Moreover, we did not want hordes of triumphant
Bolsheviks pouring into Khorasan.
Mr. Keynes said that if it was decided to give financial aid it
would be impossible for us to deal in roubles ; we could, however,
open, to a limited extent, a credit in krans at Meshed. He did not
think we were committed to anything beyond a lump sum as a
donation to clear off any obligations to which we had been
committed by Malleson’s promises. Lord Robert had said that he
would prefer to support Denekin rather than the Askabad Govern
ment ; he, himself, did not think that we had ever derived the
slightest benefit from sums paid to persons in Russia.
Lord Robert Cecil pointed out that but for our support General
Alexieff would have entirely gone under.
The Committee decided that—
(a.) A lump sum, to be paid in Persian money at Meshed, should
be granted as a donation to clear off any financial
liabilities to which we may have been committed by
General Malleson.
(b.) The Treasury, in concert with the India Office The department of the British Government to which the Government of India reported between 1858 and 1947. The successor to the Court of Directors. , should
determine the amount of our obligations and draft a
telegram* to the Indian Government communicating the
Governmemt’s decision and explaining in what manner
effect should be given to it, for the Chairman s approval
before despatch.
Non .—The telegram as despatched is printed as Appendix V to these Minutes.
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