Papers of the War Cabinet's Eastern Committee [‎151r] (301/544)

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really start business for another three or four months, bv which
time our policy should be determined.
The Chairman referred to Instruction 5 (iii) regarding the
future status of the Mosul vilayet, which Wilson had recommended
slumld be under the same administration as Baghdad. The Com
mittee had, at that Meeting, heard from Colonel Lawrence that
Mosul might very likely not be under Baghdad administration at
all. All these matters depended upon our relations wdth Hussein,
Feisal, and others, with whom the Commission would not be in
communication, and could not, therefore, be settled by it.
Lord Robert Cecil thought there was no reason why the
Commission should not be able to consult the Arab Chieftains.
There were, moreover, many other very important questions such as
hydraulics, the control of the upper reaches of the Euphrates and
Tigris, the course of trade, &c., in regard to which the advice of the
Commission would be valuable. He argued that it would certainly
be necessary, sooner or later, to despatch a Commission to Mesopo
tamia in order to collect geographic, politic, and ethnographic data
on which the Government could form a judgment. At present,
everyone who returned from Mesopotamia seemed to take a different
view as to what should be done. The Arabs were already uneasy
and anxious to know what we proposed to do, and he thought it
dangerous to delay a decision as to our future policy. To assist in
framing that policy he stronglv urged that a Commission, consisting
of th ree persons, one a man experienced in Indian administration, a
second experienced in local conditions, and a third as head of the
Commission, a Statesman with experience of governmental and
political considerations should be sent out as soon as the right men
could be found. The main object of the Commission should be
to advise as to the right kind of administration to adopt in
Mesopotamia.
General Macdonogh said that as Adjutant-General he was par
ticularly interested in Instruction 5 (ivj, as it was necessary for him
to know, as early as possible, what garrison it was proposed we
should maintain in Mesopotamia after hostilities ceased. India
seemed to understand that she would be asked to provide a certain
number of native troops, but he wished to know whether Ke wmuld
be required to supplement these with British troops.
Mr. Montagu continued that India fully understood that she
would be asked, for the time being, to provide a native garrison. As
regards Mosul, he thought it most important that the Committee
should make up their minds exactly what they meant to do with
this vilayet. He agreed with Lord Robert that without the proper
information it was impossible for us to decide upon our economic
policy ; for instance, the question of opening banks and so on.
The Chai rman said that at present he saw serious objections to
the proposal. If the Commission were sent out, the fact would
become public, questions would be asked in Parliament, and our
Allies would be exceedingly suspicious. They would say “ you
propose, at the Peace Conference, to confront us with a fait accompli.”
He did not agree with Mr. Montagu that the Indian Government
were more opposed to the choice of subjects than to the scheme itself.
That Government had raised many other objections. What the
Committee had just heard from Colonel Lawrence showed that the
orientation of Middle East affairs had recently entirely changed.
He, himself, thought that the proposed instructors to the
Commission went much too far, and he believed that a Commission
ot this kind would only prejudice our case at the Peace Conference ;
it would hamper and not help us.
General Macdonogh said that Colonel Lawrence himself admitted
that his experience did not extend east of the Tigris, and he cmdd
not say whether the Kurd tribes on that side of the river should come
into the Arab State.
[365—36]
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