Papers of the War Cabinet's Eastern Committee [‎145v] (290/544)

6
E.C.-2047.
APPENDIX (A).
Some Notes on a Proposal for “ Unity of Command in the Middle East.'
1. “ UNI FY of commandimplies operations against a common military objective,
which may he an army or a locality.
When the proposals for a unified command were made the theatres in question
were those in which we were fio-hting the Turks, or into which pan-Mohammedan
influence might penetrate. Turkish activities depend ultimately on the security of the
Turkish capital, which is now directly threatened from the Salonica front. The centre
of gravity of the Middle East has therefore shifted to the Balkans, and operations in
Mesopotamia and in Palestine are now merely subsidiary. Consequently it would be
illogical in present circumstances to form any unified command in the Middle East
which did not include General Milne's force.
2. The Comm aider exercises his authority, firstly, by the issue of orders or
instructions for the initiation of certain operations ; and, secondly, when those
operations are in progress, mainly by the employment of his general reserve.
In planning his operations he must consider the following factors amongst
others :—
(i.) What is known of the enemy and of the country.
(ii.) The forces available for his operations.
(iii.) The transport and maintenance of those forces.
(iv.) The most convenient position for his general reserve to meet possible
eventualities, and the means of transporting it. ^
To fulfil his functions, therefore, the commander must have :—
(i.) A complete Intelligence system.
(ii.) Unrestricted disposal of all troops in the theatres for which he is responsible.
(iii.) An accurate knowledge of the general situation as regards railway and marine
transport, reinforcements in men and horses, ammunition and supply, as
affecting his operations.
(iv.) If the bases from which his various forces are operating are not connected by
land he must have absolute control of sufficient shipping to move his
reserves between his theatres as and when he wishes.
3. Briefly, the above mean that the proposed commander in the Middle East would
require a staff complete in all its branches, thus reduplicating the War Office, and if
he is effectively to control the situation he must have a pool of personnel and transport
resources, more particularly shipping, independent of his theatres. As the War Cabinet
is aware, at the present time our margin is too small to enable us to lock up a single
locomotive, lorry, or ship, which is not being fully employed, as the proposal would
involve, and all the resources of the Empire must loyally be pooled, and placed at the
disposal of one main distributing centre.
4 We know from experience that operations in any one theatre are affected by
success or failure in every other theatre, and that the Middle Eastern theatre, including
the approaches to India, is not an exception to the rule. The situation is constantly
changing, and only the authority which controls all theatres and all resources can at
anv uiven moment judge of the relative advantages of allotting such resources for any
particular operation. In the War Cabinet we have such an authority, which, through
the various Government departments, has an exact knowledge of all the many factors >
affecting the situation, both naval, military, and political. This organisation is “ unity
of control” in its highest form. Its decisions are conveyed by the War Office to the
commanders in the field, who are its executive officers, and to place any intermediate
authority between them and the W'ar Office is merely to insert into the existing
machinery an unnecessary cog-wheel with its unavoidable co-efficient of friction.
(Jeneral Staff, October 14, 1918.