Papers of the War Cabinet's Eastern Committee [‎136v] (272/544)

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withdrawing from the Caucasus, and we were not now in anything
like the same position vis-d-vis the danger of Turkish expansion a^
we were when the subsidy had been paid. Regarding the question
of communications with General Alexieff’s forces, he thought that
the opening up of Siberia to our forces and those of our Allies made
the maintenance of such communications from the South tar less
important than they had hitherto been.
Lord Robert Cecil stated that the main value of communications
with General Alexieff’s forces was to secure through them further
communications with the Czecho-Slovak forces in the Volga district,
and as it now appeared that the latter had been defeated, there was
no connection between the forces of General Alexieff and the Czechs.
He therefore hesitated as to the advisability of completely cutting
ourselves off from General Bicharakod, more especially in the event
of our getting a British fleet into the Black Sea, and requiring the
assistance of friendly torces in South Russia.
Colonel Gribbon thought that General Alexieff’s people would
probably take steps to keep in communication with us, and that this
matter might be left to them. General Thomson reported that
Bicharakoff was np longer of any value to us in connection with the
Caspian fleet, which was the most important point to be considered.
Lord Robert Cecil stated that there were clearly two distinct
points—first, the question of considering the subsidy to Bicharakoff;
and, secondly, the question of buying the fleet. The latter appeared
to him the more urgent of the two objectives.
Mr. Keynes stated that our promises of financial support to
General Bicharakoff did not extend beyond the middle of this
month, and it was not worth our while to continue the subsidy of
250,000L a month to General Bicharakoff simply for the purpose of
using him as a telegraph station. With regard to the amount of
money obtainable from the Imperial Bank of Persia, he estimated
that we could now obtain something like 40,000,000 krans a month
as against 25,000,000, which had been his previous estimate. Sir
Percy Cox required about 30,000,000 krans a month for expenditure
controlled by him, of which the most important items were—
(1.) The maintenance of the East Persian cordon.
(2.) The subsidy of the Persian Government.
(3.) The maintenance of the South Persia Rifles.
If Sir Percy Cox’s expenditure had priority over the expenditure
by the military and naval authorities in North-West Persia and the
Caspian, it might be possible to find upwards of 15,000,000
krans a month for the latter, which comprised the expenditure
between Hamadan and the Caspian inclusive. It would be impos
sible to continue payments to General Bicharakoff without cutting
expenditure elsewhere. He wished to make it clear that the
Imperial Bank of Persia, although pressed, had refused to give us
any estimate of the amount of money which they could place at our
disposal, and that the estimate of 40,000,000 krans per month was
his own.
Admiral Hope stated that all expenditure by the naval autho
rities was being done through the army, and that the estimated cost
of maintaining the ships already in our possession on the Caspian
amounted to 20,000i. sterling a month. Now that our ships were
armed, it was quite clear that the Bolshevik fleet in Baku was
frightened of us, and he thought we could aHord to neglect it.
Lord Robert Cecil thought we should take every opportunity
of getting all the ships we could in addition to those already in our
hands, as the Turks or Germans might seize the Bolshevik ships and
man them with their own forces.
Colonel Gribbon stated that intelligence reports showed that
although some of the German troops had left the Caucasus, there
were still Germans in the neighbourhood, and that it was known
that they had been making financial arrangements for purchase.