Papers of the War Cabinet's Eastern Committee [‎134r] (267/544)

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Our present policy is out of harmony with our general professions in the war,
has always been opposed by the Government of India, and seems to me to have led
to the unhappy events of the past few weeks, and to be liable to lead to the dissi
pation of forces urgently required in the real centres of war. If we had a policy
of cordon-cum-alliance, we could still employ agent*, such as Dunsterville and
Stokes; we could still, of course, protect our oil-fields; we should be in a far less
dangerous position, and, I should have thought, would have achieved everything
that we require south of the Hamadan Hoad. As regards the north, we should still
be exposed to the Trans-Caspian danger, which requires separate treatment, and
the enlistment of co-operation in lurkestan. .
It seems to me that there is only one alternative to this, and that is a real,
sustained, imperative military expedition into Persia,, whole-heartedly antagon
istic to the Persians: but this would only be adopted after the other had been tried
and had failed. I do not think that w^e wish, if it can be avoided, to embark on
new military operations, but I cannot help wondering whether we are not at the
moment falling between two stools. ^ 0 ^
(Initialled) E. S. M.
June 5, 1918.
PERSIA.
(E.C.-1718.)
Mr. Balfour to Sir P. Cox (Tehran).
(No. 511.) Foreign Office, September 27, 1918, 9 r. m.
GENERAL situation as described in your telegram No. 831 of 23rd September
has been carefully considered. It is assumed that when drafting your telegram you
were still unaware of great success recently attained by General Allenby in Palestine
and the victories in Bulgaria, which may be expected materially to affect both the
actual position and further proceedings of the Turks in North-West Persia, and the
general opinion in Persia as to the ultimate defeat of the German-iurkish cause.
1 should be glad to hear to what extent situation described in your telegram may
accordingly have changed. , .
Turning to the concessions which would, in opinion of Persian I rime Minister,
render his Government “ popular,” His Majesty’s Government are prepared to agree
to both points 1 and 2. As regards the first part of point 3, namely, the transfer
of South Persia Rifles at Shiraz to Persian control, is there not a danger that such a
measure might have bad effect on maintenance of order throughout Pars, and, indeed,
all Southern Persia. If, however, you have satisfied yourself that no undue risk will
be incurred, His Majesty’s Government are prepared to agree to hand over control of
force in the manner suggested. They are doubtful as to the desirability of any
commission of neutral officers arriving in Persia at the present juncture. In any case
Swiss would be preferable to Scandinavian officers, and to this Vossugh-ed-Dowleh
would presumably raise no objection, in view of statement reported m second sentence
of Sir 0. Mailing’s telegram No. 746 of 27th August. You may, however, be able to
get him to drop the commission of neutral officers for the present which we should
greatly prefer. If we agree to the Ears South Persia Rifles being made oyer to
Persian control at once, the need of such Commission does not appear to be pressing.
Subject to the above amendments, Hifc Majesty’s Government concAir in publication
of proposed communique. I hey would, however, strongly deprecate taking the fuither
steps suggested for originating correspondence with both belligerents respecting the
reciprocal evacuation of Persian territory. Whatever the nature^of the lurkish reply
to a request for evacuation (on this point see my telegram No. 33 of 10th January),
the freedom of action of our military authorities might be seriously impaired, having
regard t ■ the possibility of a continuance or future renewal of Turkish activities
notwithstanding any undertakings given, and to the danger which may threaten our
position in the Caspian region even beyond the Persian border.
You v ill no doubt furnish me with your observations on the above points before
taking any further definite action.
(Repeated to India.)
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