Papers of the War Cabinet's Eastern Committee [‎131r] (261/544)

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Lord Robert Cecil said that it was most important that the
French should not be allowed to annex any portion of the blue
area. We wished to secure the co-operation of the Americans in
settling the future of the occupied territories, and in order to do
this we must declare against annexation. As regards Basra, he
thought in practice it would always be possible for us to control
it, whether we annexed it or established a protectorate. What
we wished to set up were independent Arab administrations in
areas “A” and "B,” and to help the Arabs towards stable
government. He thought that this policy should be extended
also to the blue and red areas on the map. All that clause 3 of
the Report before the Committee bound them to was (a) no
annexation of Arab territories, (b) independent Arab govern
ment. He suggested that the clause should be accepted, and
that when it came to drafting a joint declaration our policy
should be no annexation in the red and blue areas, and that in
“ A and '■ B " there should be an independent Arab administra
tion with European advisers. There was.some danger that the
French might suddenly publish a declaration on their own
account and expect us to accept it. To obviate this we should at
once make it clear to the French Government that we expected to
be consulted in the event of their having any such intention.
Mr. Montagu urged very strongly that the Committee should
accept clause 3. He hoped very much that both the British and
French Governments would mutually agree to exclude annexa
tion. His Majesty's Government stood to lose nothing by
pledging itself not to use the word “annexation." We could
maintain the Arab facade and yet ensure British paramountcy.
General Smuts agreed that annexation was unnecessary.
General Macdonogh thought it might be difficult for us to
explain our position at Basra. We proposed to pledge ourselves
to an independent Arab state. How could Basra be independent
if we were there?
The Chairman quoted the following from the minutes of the
5th meeting:—
“ Sir P. Cox had been given instructions, to guide his
actions, that Basra would remain British, although these
had not'been actually promulgated. The case of Basra,
therefore, differed from the case of the rest of Iraq, where
the population had not received explicit pledges of the same
nature. ... In view of the political and commercial
interests involved, and of the specific pledges that had been
given to the people of Basra, who had been told that we
should not leave, it might be desirable to keep Basra town
and district entirely in British hands. This district would
extend from Fao, at the mouth of the Shatt-el-Arab, 20 miles
from Basra, to Gurmat Ali, where the Euphrates joined,
10 miles higher, or possibly Kurnah. This area contained
a population of approximately 80,000, the vast majority
being Arabs, the remainder Jews, Indians, Syrians,
Christians, Sabeans, &c. . . . With regard to the dis
trict of Basra, General Macdonogh suggested that its limits
should be extended to a line passing through Nasirieh and
north of Kurnah to the Persian frontier at Hawizah. This
would yield a defensible strategic frontier. It was pointed
out by Lord Hardinge that this line would apparently
involve the inclusion of Amara also. The advisability of
proclaiming the annexation of Basra and its neighbourhood
was then discussed. Should the word ‘ annexation ’ appear
too inauspicious (as suggested by Sir Mark Sykes), the
Chairman expressed the hope that a terminological variant,
such as £ perpetual lease ’ or ‘ enclave An area of land belonging to one country and entirely surrounded by land of just one other country. ,’ might be found,
both to safeguard the reality which we must not abandon,
and to save the appearances which the occasion might
require.
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