Papers of the War Cabinet's Eastern Committee [‎128r] (255/544)

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transferred to Baku. It will be noted that the present high-water mark of the
Turkish advance corresponds with the frontier of the Persian province of Azerbaijan
proper, as shown by a yellow line on the map, and though it would of course be
unwise to frame our plans on the above assumption, the situation is being watched
carefully from that point of view, bearing in mind that the Turks doubtless hope
to include Enzeli in at least a temporary sphere of occupation.
4. The Caspian Sector.
On the 20th August Enver ordered live of the seven regiments at Baku to clear
up the situation on the south-west coast of the Caspian and to occupy Enzeli; this
was to be done after consultation with Khalil, who is commanding the Eastern
Group of Armies. In order to facilitate this move the Turks are reported to have
occupied Ardabil and moved on Lenkoran and Astara, thus securing the coast road,
so as once more to establish communication with the Jungalis. The only opposition
that the Turks might encounter is during the march through the Mughan Steppe, but
not much store should be set on this, as the Mughan Russians are said to be consider
ing the inadvisability of offering resistance. The distance from Aji Kabul, on
the Tiflis-Baku railway, to Enzeli is over 200 miles and the road is poor. R is
unlikely therefore that the troops from Baku could reach Enzeli before the 5th
October.
5. North Caucasus.
The Turks appear to intend leaving only one regiment at Baku, and Enver, on
the 20th September, ordered one regiment (three battalions), which was to be
brought up to strength, accompanied by a strong force of artillery and machine guns,
to clear Derbend and Petrovsk and occupy North Caucasus as far as the lerek River.
In this connection it mav be noted that Bicharakov had already, on the 8th
September, reported a force of two Turkish battalions and some 3,500 irregulars m
the Gunib-Levashtki area, south of Temir Khan Shura. . .
The above order is in keeping with the known Turkish aspiration tor an
autonomous friendly Moslem Cis-Caucasia. The sympathies of the Moslems of
Dao-hestan and the Terek country are reported to be with the lurks, and the
Germans fear the control of the Grosni oilfields falling into Turkish hands.
i 'The effect of the Allied Successes in Palestine and the Balknns.
The Turkish conception will doubtless be influenced by Allied successes in
^Wine and the Balkans. The former has already had an appreciable effect on the
itua^ion ^Azerbaijan, for, at the commencement of General Allenby’s advance, the
0th Caucasus Division, which was under orders to move to Tabriz, received orders
o counter- march to Constantinople. It is as yet too early to say what will be the
■uU “fleet of the Palestine victory in the Caucasus and North-West Persia, but
here can be little doubt that it will ease the situation materially, regarding the
lotential threat on our communications in the neighbourhood of kasvm.
r . The Caspian Fleet.
ThP situation of the Caspian fleet is not yet definite, but Bicharakov, who still
t he situation or r i . d th 21gt September that he controlled
iclds Petrovsk sUted in a letter^rece^e^ ^ ^ ^ , iai80n offioer with
I'® Russian'fleet from whom a message was received on the 23rd September to the
he Russian fleet tro acknowledges Bicharakov’s authority, and will obey
tfect that t ie e , September a fso Commodore Norris reported that the
S':, n.? «-*. -1—*
hips under repair probably remamin^ at « u - require confirmation, and
Though the above reports regarding little doubt that the
licharakov s position not fi^ ^ of the Xurks> and this, combined with
najority ot the ‘ j Caucasus Division, appears to the War Office to justify
lahnent ”'Bichlrakov, in accordance with General Officer Commanding Mesopo-
Ss telegram No. X 2359 of the 20th September.
General Staff, War Office,
September 26, 1918.