Papers of the War Cabinet's Eastern Committee [‎127r] (253/544)

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17
The story of the defence of Baku from this date to its fall, on the 15th
September, is too well known to need recapitulation here. Its outstanding features
are:—
(a.) That the British troops under Dunsterville bore the whole brunt of the
continuous fighting.
(b.) That during the fighting, viz., on the 2nd September, Marshall told
Dunsterville he would receive no more reinforcements, and should
evacuate the town at once. The War Office agreed with this.
Dunsterville pointed out on the 9th September that with unarmed ships, and
under the guns of hostile fleet, evacuation was not possible, and that in his opinion
he must stand by the Government, who had decided not to surrender. His Majesty's
Government permitted this on the 11th September. The last defensive positions
were forced on the 14th, and Dunsterville withdrew his force, after fighting the
enemy to a standstill on the night of the 14th/15th September, bringing off all his
troops and guns and destroying material he could not move.
Definite orders were issued for his removal from his command by Marshall on
the 17th September.
The points that appear to arise out of consideration and study from a
chronological point of view of these telegrams are:—
1. That General Dunsterville proposed on the 4th June, 1918, to undertake the
the defence of Baku, but that sanction was not given to his doing so until the 15th
July, and then only conditionally.
' 2. It is evident from the War Office telegram of the 28th June to G.-O.-C.
Mesopotamia that neither His Majesty’s Government nor the General Staff were
satisfied that General Marshall had up to that time made as great an effort as was
possible towards the Caspian The telegram in question is a very strong one, and
specified exactly where they considered General Marshall has failed. It has already
been pointed out by the Eastern Committee, both by General Smuts and by General
Cox, that General Marshall originally estimated that he would not be able to support
more than 1,000 men with motor-cars on the western cordon. This, however, has
been gradually expanded until, as we know now, General Marshall has between
Khanikin and Enzeli considerably over the strength of a strong war brigade, as well
as 3,000 to 4,000 levies and auxiliary troops, who are all presumably supported along
the same road. It is perfectly evident, therefore, that General Marshall's original
estimate of what the road could support was incorrect, and the inference may fairly
be drawn that he was not at first sufficiently in earnest about it to make sure that
his information was incorrect. In this connection it is worthy of note that he has
within the last week discovered a possible railway alignment to Kermanshah, avoid
ing the Paitak Pass, and this looks as though the L. of C. problem had not
hitherto been investigated as thoroughly as it should have been, considering its
immense importance. , . . , t „ , , „ „
3. In the middle of the very difficult and intricate problem of the defence of
Baku Dunsterville was ordered to withdraw. It would be hard to realise anything
more discouraging to a commander, placed as General Dunsterville was then, with
strong hostile forces in front of him and treachery within the town itself, than the
4 In the face of all this General Dunsterville finished his adventures by
fighting the enemy to a standstill in front of the town, and brings off his troops and
p> U ns without loss, in spite of the endeavours of a hostile fleet to prevent him, and
& k , • i p .1.1 rv inrr witVi Tt is snhmitfprl
contrary to me wisnes oi me vruvcii ^-ey yyr ,7 ; -7
that in effecting this he saved British prestige in that part of the world, and as it
i i u t irv ™ ra-W wav If he had accented the order sent him on
September 25, 1918.
[365—32]
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