Papers of the War Cabinet's Eastern Committee [‎123v] (246/544)

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APPENDIX I.
(AT.) (E.C.-1648.)
RELATIONS WITH BIN SAUD.
(Note by Political Department, India, Office.)
1. The recent heavy crop of telegrams on this subject have somewhat obscured
the main issues, and it may make for convenience if a statement is placed before the
Eastern Committee at this stage dealing comprehensively with the whole question.
2. It is the case, as pointed out in Baghdad telegram of the 15th September,
that the recent orders of His Majesty’s Government involve some departure from the
policy adopted in March last. In his telegram of the 9th March, 1918, Sir P. Cox
subftiitted the following recommendations, which were approved by His Majesty's
Government: —
“We recognise he \_i.e., Bin Saudj may not find it possible to undertake
operations on such a large scale as to enable him to capture Hail, and our
operations are proceeding so well in Syria that we feel that there is no necessity
to press him unduly in this connection, but at any rate it is still most important
that he should maintain more effective control in Qasim and stop smuggling
and put real pressure on Shammar. To this end we are prepared to assist him
with 1,000 more rifles, 100,000 rounds, which Mr. Philby will place at his
disposal as necessity arises. He may also regard as a gift the advance of two
months 0 subsidy made him by Mr. Philby.
“ As regards Hail, I do not consider Ibn Saud is really keen on taking it
except in circumstances which make it apparent that he is doing so at our
bidding and under our direction. At the same time,, should good opportunity
arise for his doing so, either by diplomacy or force, with above meagre assist
ance, I understand there would be no objection to it in principle, either on the
part of His Majesty’s Government or High Commissioner. If it should come
to pass, I think we should be prepared to double Ibn Saud’s subsidy or give
him good lump sum. I trust general approval will be telegraphed to our
proceeding on above lines, and that General Officer Commanding may be
authorised to supply rifles.”
3. The recent orders, conveyed in the Secretary of State’s telegram of the
13th September, laid it down that “ Bin Saud should be kept as quiet as possible
and should be restrained, if possible, from military activity or aggressive action in
any direction ” ; and that His Majesty’s Government were “ against increasing his
armed strength or encouraging him to attack Bin Rashid at the present juncture.”
In other words, our attitude towards the Hail expedition has changed from some
what lukewarm support to actual discouragement.
4. It may well be doubted whether Bin Saud would, in any circumstances, have
seriously pressed an offensive against Bin Rashid. But the policy of encouraging
him to pursue the project had at least the advantage of diverting his activities from
channels likely to bring him into collision with the King of the Hejaz. The enmity
between these two Arab chieftains is deep-seated. It reflects many years of rivalry
between Mecca and Riadh, aggravated by the personal jealousy between the two
men and by the sectarian feud between Sunni and Wahabi. King Husain, apart
from personal animosity, appears to be genuinely apprehensive of the spread of the
Wahabi movement, of which Bin Saud is the figurehead, in the direction of the
Hejaz. This feeling was probably at the back of his recent action at Khurma, which
is the immediate subject of dispute with Bin Saud. For the moment the situation is
eased. Bin Baud is reported to have found a temporary diversion in the Koweit
direction, where the Ajman and other tribesmen are engaging his attention; while
the King, probablv as a result of our representations, shows a disposition not to
force the pace at Khurma. But we cannot count on more than a breathing space,
and the trouble between the two chiefs is certain to revive unless some modus vivendi
<?an be found between them.