Papers of the War Cabinet's Eastern Committee [‎115r] (229/544)

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letter. He did not propose, however, to discuss it in Lord -Robert's
absence. As regards the respective proposals put forward by General
Smuts and Mr. Montagu, he thought it desirable that the Committee
should know what the views of the Indian Government and the
Commander-in-Chief were likely to be. At their previous meeting
Mr. Montagu had suggested that the gist of General Smuts’
memorandum should be telegraphed to India. To this he had
demurred, as, if it was decided not to proceed with these proposals,
to communicate them prematurely to India could only have a
disturbing effect. As the result of the present discussion, however,
he thought that a telegram might be sent to India somewhat on the
following lines. It might state that His Majesty’s Government
were much impressed generally with the advisability of securing
greater unity of command. They felt, however, that the exercise of
such a command from India was impracticable in present circum
stances. In order to secure this unity, however, to place the
command in competent hands, and, as far as possible, to meet General
Monro’s views, it had been suggested, as a temporary solution, that
General Monro should be appointed Commander-in-Cbief, under the
War Office, in Mesopotamia, Persia, and Central Asia, with his
headquarters at Baghdad. If, however, at a later date India should
be seriously menaced. General Monro would revert to his present
command and the whole situation, as well as the particular question
of single control, would be reviewed by this Government.
The Chairman, proceeding, said that he himself was in agree
ment with the views expressed by Mr. Balfour and General Smuts.
General Wilson, however, dissented, and Mr. Montagu was averse
from moving Sir Charles Monro unless he could be given a much
greater command, viz., one extending from the eastern shores of the
Mediterranean to India. In reply to Mr. Montagu’s contention that,
if it was only proposed to replace General Marshall by General Monro,
the expression 4 ‘ unity of command ” should not be employed in this
connection, the Chairman proceeded to point out that if General
Monro went to Baghdad, his command would be considerably greater
than Mr. Montagu seemed to think, since it would include Mesopo
tamia, Bushire, Bunder Abbas, North-West Persia and the Caspian
road, Meshed, the Eastern cordon, and any further developments
that might occur in the direction of Turkestan.
General Wilson did not think that the War Office would agree
to General Monro replacing General Marshall and going to Baghdad
to take over the new command. If an active,- pushing General was
desired, General Monro, by his own showing, was not the man for
the job. He did not agree with the Committee that there was any
necessity to change our present G.O.C. in Mesopotamia. He thought
that a great deal of smoke had arisen from what was quite a small
fire, as all that was involved was the moving of 10,000 or 11,000
men, who, as a matter of fact, could not be moved until more cars
were available.
Mr. Balfour protested against General Wilson’s judging only
by the number of troops and not by the importance of the issues
involved.
General Cox said that the principal enemy the Committee had
to consider was, of course, the Turk. If it was desired to achieve
unity of command against the Turk, he did not see how this could
be done unless Palestine were included in that command. The true
test of command w T as not the sources of men and supply, but the
strategical position. He himself entirely concurred with General
Smuts, to every word of whose memorandum he subscribed. He
agreed that the Committee had not been well served by General
Marshall. Marshall had originally said that it was only possible to
maintain 1,00o men on the road; he had now managed to put 4,000
there, but this was only owing to constant goadings from the
Committee. If it were true that he had evacuated Enzeli, he
thought he was guilty of a disastrous mistake. General Wilson had