Papers of the War Cabinet's Eastern Committee [‎113v] (226/544)

4
the Middle East, however, the initiative appeared to be passing to
the Turks, and, apart from the danger to India, if they achieved any
considerable successes, our position in regard to this theatre would
be distinctly unfavourable when we came to discuss terms of poace.
There was no doubt that it was in the East that we were most
vulnerable, and it was essential to deal firmly with the situation
without delay.
General Wilson said that he agreed with General Smuts on the
question of the unity of command. As regards the military position,
however, he did not take so pessimistic a view ; nor did he agree as to
the value set by General Smuts upon the respective capacities of
Generals Monro and Marshall. We already had unity of command from
Baghdad to Krasnovodsk, and this command General Smuts would
extend to Meshed. The rough-and-ready rule adopted by the War
Office had been that men based on Baghdad should remain under the
War Office, and those based on Meshed should be under India. He
did not think it wise to hand over, the control of operations in
Mesopotamia to India. In its essence, General Smuts’ point was
that a change of personnel was required ; beyond that, his suggestion
mereiy amounted to placing Malleson’s force under the command of
the G.O.C., Mesopotamia.
The Chairman pointed out that if the enemy crossed the Caspian ^
and obtained control of the Transcaspian railway, Malleson’s area
might extend to Bokhara and even Tashkent, and would greatly
increase in importance.
General Wilson said that the real difficulty was that of »
transport. This difficulty equally confronted the enemy, who was
no more able than ourselves to push forward considerable forces.
General Marshall felt that he would not allow himself to be cut in
two at Kasvin and for this reason he wished to withdraw from Enzeli.
In that view he might be quite right, although he might be
disposed to exaggerate the menace to the Kasvin line. If the
Bolsheviks already commanded the Caspian Sea and controlled the
fieet the loss of Enzeli was not such a serious matter. Any ships
we might have in our possession we could either take to Krasnovodsk
or sink.
General Smuts said that to give up the Caspian meant a very
serious retreat on our part.
Mr. Montagu pointed out that Baku had fallen and that it was
reported that we had already evacuated Enzeli. If this was the
case, the Caspian was lost to us.
General Wilson said that in General Smuts’ view, General
Marshall was not equal to his position in the altered circumstances,
and that it would be better to replace him by General Monro. He \
did not agree with this view, and read various telegrams from
General Monro which, he pointed out, were contradictory in the
advice they gave. It was evident that General Monro had the same
difficulty as the Committee in appreciating the situation. Further, ^
to offer General Monro the Mesopotamia command, increased only
by Malleson’s 500 men, was derogatory to an officer who held the
biggest command open in peace time to anyone in the British
service.
General Smuts pointed out that the Middle Eastern command
would be more important than that of Palestine, and he understood
that General Monro was hardly, if at all, senior to General Allenby.
Mr. Montagu interposed to ask whether General Smuts intended
that General Monro should replace General Marshall or whether
General Marshall should continue to serve, or that some other officer
should serve, in actual command in the field under General Monro’s
orders. He asked this question because when he was in India he
knew that General Monro did not think himself physically capable
of taking command in the field owing to the consequences of an
accident to his leg which he thought he had sustained in Gallipoli.
When General Maude died, the Viceroy and he had considered