Papers of the War Cabinet's Eastern Committee [‎112v] (224/544)

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The Caspian and
Trans-Caspia.
2 The Chairman read to the Committee two telegrams which
he had received a few minutes before the meeting, one trom the
Commander-in-Chief in India, No. 74078, dated the /^th Se p te m^ e r
(EC-1579), forwarding a message from General Malieson tnat
information received from Askabad on the 14th instant was to the
effect that the Bolsheviks in Astrakhan had armed five named
steamers for service in the Caspian, and further suggesting that it
the Enzeli route was closed, the naval contingent and their guns
should come vi& Hamadan and Teheran to Meshed, and thence to
Krasnovodsk. Even if ships were not available to arm, they would
be of the greatest value for the defence of Krasnovodsk against
attack from the sea. In this connection the Chairman pointed out
that the statement in General Smuts’ paper (E.G.-156o) that our
friends in Russia held Petrovsk and Astrakhan was unfortunately
untrue of Astrakhan, which was in the hands of the Bolsheviks.
The second message, dated 17th September, was from Com-
Persian Gulf The historical term used to describe the body of water between the Arabian Peninsula and Iran. (E.C.-l 578), to the following effect:--
“ Expect representatives of the fleet here to-day or to
morrow. Dunsterville leaves to-morrow and evacuation of
Enzeli is ordered. Thus, just as there is a chance of coming
to terms, the fleet will see British troops being weakened.
This may result in hostile action. It will stop efforts to
continue arming ships. Please telegraph ‘ clear the hoe what
is now our policy and whether efforts to get control of Caspian
are to continue. Naval control is only effective if backed by
military forces.’ .
The Chairman said that, if the information received by the
Commodore was accurate, it showed that Dunsterville had
evacuated or was evacuating Enzeli, in accordance with Genera
Marshall’s instructions and w r as retiring on Kasvin. I he above
telegrams complicated the situation and showed the great confusion
that at present prevailed in the Caspian area.
The Committee agreed—
That the evacuation of Enzeli, following closely upon that of
Baku, would he highly prejudicial to our prestige, and that
it was desirable to hold on to Enzeh at all costs if it were
not too late.
The Committee accordingly directed the War Office to
telegraph urgently to General Marshall stating the great
importance His Majesty s Government attached to the reten
tion of Enzeli, and instructing him that the port should
only he evacuated as a last resort and on account of urgent
military necessity.
*
t
t
Suggested Unifica
tion of Political
and Military
Control in the
Eastern Theatres
of War under
India.
3. The Commutes resumed the discussion of the question of the
suggested unification of political and military contiol in the Eastern
theatres of war under India (31st Meeting, Minute 1). The
Committee had before them a telegram from the Commander-in-
Chief in India, No. 66078 (E.C.-1295), the Chief of the Imperial
General Staff’s draft reply to the above (E.C.-1534), a Memorandum
by General Smuts regarding the military command in the Middle
East (E.C.-1565), and a letter from Lord Robert Cecil to Mr. Balfour
(E.O.-1564) (Appendices (A), (B), (C), and (D) ).
General Smuts said that his paper raised two points: first, the
question of unity of command, l^n regard to this he thought it
impossible to demarcate the provinces politically and militarily,
especially the latter. The previous week the Government of India
had proposed that there should be unity of command which would
be exercised from India; this proposition he himself did not regard
as practicable. It was true that the troops in that theatre were
mainly supplied from India, but his view was, that our policy must
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