Papers of the War Cabinet's Eastern Committee [‎110v] (220/544)

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m (Situation.
had* been sent to Mr. Balfour by Lord Robert Cecil, drawing
somewhat similar conclusions from the same premises. He gatheied
that Lord Robert Cecil’s idea was to create a Middle Eastern
Department of the General Stall at the War Oflice and the
appointment of a General Officer in supreme command over all
Eastern theatres. General Smuts was returning to London the
following day, and he therefore proposed that furthei discussion ol
the subject should be postponed fora special Meeting of the Eastern
Committee, at which both General Smuts and the Chief of the
Imperial General Stall could be present.
Mr. Montagu stated that, after the last Meeting, he had handed
to General Macdonogh a rough diagram illustrating a proposal
similar in object to that made by General Smuts.
General Macdonogh stated that the Chief of the Imperial
General Stall thought that complications would arise with the
Indian Government if the Commander in-Chief in India were placed
in command of all Middle Eastern theatres, as General Monro was
primarily the servant of the Government of India.
The Chairman added that the Coramander-in-Chief in India
was a Member of the Government of India in Council for military
purposes, and that the Governor-General’s Council would be placed
in a somewhat anomalous position if the Commander-in-Chief in
India were placed for all purposes under the War Office, and was
bound to carry out its orders irrespective of the views of the
Government of India.
2. The Chairman stated that, at the last Meeting, it had been
agreed, in consequence of telegrams received from General
Dunsterville, that the latter should be authorised to remain at Baku.
This decision had been reached largely owing to the hope that
assistance would be forthcoming from General Bicharakoff at
Petrovsk, the first party of whose forces had been reported to have
reached Baku. It appeared, however, from a telegram received the
previous day that General Dunsterville had abandoned Baku and
had evacuated the town, bringing with him 1.200 men. It was not
clear whether these 1,200 men were all British troops or not.
General Dunsterville had proceeded to Enzeli and not toKrasnovodsk,
and the focus of interest was accordingly now transferred to Pinzeli,
Krasnovodsk, and Kasvin. It seemed to be vital to hold on to
Enzeli, as the main object of the expedition had been to secure
naval command of the Caspian Sea. The most serious information
that had been received in the last few days lay in the fact that,
owing to the advance of the Turks on the Mianeh road and con
sequent threat to Kasvin, General Marshall appeared to be
contemplating the withdrawal of troops from Enzeii to reinforce our
troops at Kasvin.
General Macdonogh stated that we were still without information
regarding the Caspian fleet. It would appear that General
Dunsterville had obtained the use of ten ships, but nothing was
known of the remainder.
Admiral Hope stated that Commodore Norris proposed to arm
ten ships and six tugs, and with these it should be possible to
ensure naval control of the Caspian.
General Macdonogh stated that the last instructions from
General Marshall to General Dunsterville were to evacuate from
Baku to Krasnovodsk. The latter had however, gone to Enzeli,
probably in order to evacuate the sick and to get further supplies
of ammunition. There were rumours that the Bolsheviks at
Astrakhan were contemplating an expedition to Krasnovodsk in
order to turn us out of that place. Information had been received,
however, that the Cossacks had taken Tsaritsin, which fact con
stituted a grave threat to the Bolsheviks in Astrakhan. In the
event of our being compelled to withdraw from Enzeli in order to