Papers of the War Cabinet's Eastern Committee [‎107v] (214/544)

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North-West Persia:
Railways and
Roads.
Persia:
Attitude of Persian
Government.
In regard to the general question of political and military con-
trol, General Macdonogh stated that the War Office were very
anxious to avoid the establishment of dual military control, partly
in London and partly in India, as all theatres were so inter
dependent that it was essential that control should be centralised
somewhere, and that could only be in London.
Mr. Montagu dissented from this view, and stated that, in
his opinion, it was desirable to have a separate Eastern Command.
Hitherto all military opinion had been opposed to this, but now the
Commander-in-Chief had come forward with the very proposal
which he had advocated for some time past. He thought that it
was clear that General Marshall regarded the Caspian and Persian
theatres as unwelcome adjuncts which might interfere with his
further operations in Mesopotamia. This pointed to the necessity
of some change in the higher military organisation in the East.
He realised, however, that the Committee had already decided in
the opposite sense.
Further discussion on this subject was adjourned until
Tuesday next.
3. General Macdonogh stated that the main thing to be done
was to improve the communication between Mesopotamia and
Hamadan by the Kermanshah road. It was proposed to continue
the Tigris-Diala railway to Kasr-i-Shirin. An alternative pro
posal had been made to continue the railway through Kirkuk to
the waters of the lesser Zab. This would enable our operations to
develop in the direction of Lake Urumia on the flank of any
Turkish advance from Tabriz in a south-easterly direction, and
would give us control of valuable oil-bearing areas round Kirkuk,
which had a much better climate than that of Baghdad owing to
its greater elevation above sea level.
In the absence of the Chief of the Imperial General Staff no
final decision had been reached upon this project, which did not
appear to be favoured by General Marshall.
4. The Committee had before them three telegrams (E.C.-1465,
1468, and Foreign Office telegram No. 800 from Sir C. Marling,
dated the 10th September). These telegrams all suggested that the
Prime Minister of Persia was in favour of abandoning neutrality
and joining us. On the other hand, in General Marshall’s view it
was undesirable that Persia should abandon her attitude of
neutrality, inasmuch as we should be held responsible for any
Turkish devastation of Persian territories. It was pointed out,
however, that the Turks had already advanced far into Persia, and
would probably devastate the country whether Persia remained
neutral or not.
General Macdonogh stated that Lord Milner was in favour of
bringing Persia into the war on our side.
The Chairman referred to a telegram sent by the British
Military Attache at Teheran to General Dunstervifle on the 5th
September, from which it would appear that an ultimatum had
already been sent by the Turks to the Persian Government.
The Committee decided—
To await receipt of further information from Sir C. Marling
before coming to a decision.