Papers of the War Cabinet's Eastern Committee [‎102r] (203/544)

that might arise, General Macdonogh said that Cobbe might possibly
deride that it was necessary to withdraw; he would then inform
wnS anf ask , hlm t0 cover his retirement. The view of the
ZZ dTt, TTt u at ¥ arsha11 sho,,ld control ! ‘ 11 operations facing
w est and that Malleson s eyes should be turned mainly to the east
towards I ash ken t and Afghanistan. After all, Malleson’s force was
Mmost negligible, consisting as it did of some 500 regulars, to which
might be added later certain levies raised locally.
Lord Robert Cecil said that he perceived difficulties in the
P e jf? n n P ro P° sa l- General Cobbe would be able to send instructions
instrn!t?o ’ wh ° WOu d . . have the n s ht of a PP eaI to India if those
from the T d' ;ere p n 9plnt contrar -'- to the orders he had received
from the Indian Government, This, as General Cox pointed out
true < th P at aC Mal I lelo SOn ’ f m -o 11 emba rrassing position. It was
tine that Malleson and Dunsterville were really carrying out a
common operation, and as events east of the Caspian re-acted
qiuc ^t at Baku and m North Persia, it was desirable to have a
s ngle control 1 he Mar Office proposed to empower Cobbe to
issue mdehnite orders to Malleson, to which the latter might or
mig it not conform lie himself had an alternative suggestion •
Indbw^T^’ , A ! g lamStan ’ and the Cordon were t0 ^ under
, e of demarcation should be drawn north of Meshed
and that Irans-Caspia should be kept under Marshall, but that the
Commander-m-Chief in India should have the power of veto
Jwi vi ^pd' 01 ! 8 tllat might affect Afghanistan. The
fralt said that the Caspian Commander would have the power to
wnTlT Ca e hls „ wl . shes d ‘ r ect to Malleson ; these wishes, however
would ho "t 1 3 mtents and Purposes, orders, and Malleson
uould have to serve two masters. Lord Robert cited a possible
case where Cobbe might ask Malleson to defend Tejend • if
Sir ChTrleoM^ 1 ‘ h S COnfl ;S ted With his S eneraI iustructions from
bir C.harles Monro, he would have to refer to India. He himself
agreed with General Cox that the discretionary power ought to be
gnen to the senior officer, Cobbe, and not to Malleson. There must
he a point, say, Askabad, at which normally the control of operations
would h aSt rf imder India C but ' Practically, due consideration
o d have to be given to the military situation at Krasnovodsk
which would be under Cobbe, and in Lord Robert’s view the latter
made'to'Tndia 6 person to decide when reference should be
Mr. Montagu thought that the situation now under discussion
had its origin in the promise made to General Malleson to send guns
ahlenfTim 3 TU 11 ! 11 a l 6 "' , day , S - This P rolni8e we had not been
fnliil 1 1 r i Pbe fact that he had made it m expectation of its
hlment did not mean a lack of co-ordination. The War Office had
ecu expecting a telegram which had never arrived, and the draft
under consideration by the Committee -was reallv a replv to a
*i? ran i concerned a message which had not vet been
sent. He thought the Committee could take no decision until the
io\ ernment of India s telegram was received. At the same time it
was desirable to find out whether the Indian Government meant to
take the matter np.
I he Chairman agreed that the Committee could take no action
on a personal telegram, .and that it was desirable to ascertain the
Government of India s views. It seemed fairly clear that General
i onro had ju mind the creation of a special war area with its own
General Officer Commanding and Staff.
General Macdonogh interposed to say that this was not possible
as Ounsterville drew his resources from General Marshall and
Malleson from India via Mirjawa. He suggested that the draft
before the Committee should, in its amended form, be a private
message from Sir Henry Wilson to Sir Charles Monro, askm^if
iTanvtl . SOn rwd -right Sir Charles’ views, and further,
1 ' te * e S lam f 1Gm the Indian Government might be expected
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