Papers of the War Cabinet's Eastern Committee [‎95v] (190/544)

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APPENDIX L
E.C.-1166.
War Office to C.-vn-C., India.—(Repeated to G.O.C., Mesopotamia.)
War Office, August 14, 1918.
64309 Cipher. D.M.O. . ,
1. With regard to India’s 63088 of the 10th August, it is not desirable that the
War Office should lav down in detail the policy for Malleson as the situation is
kaleidoscopic in its nature and is none too clear. Moreover, India has direct control
of Malleson’s mission. It may, however, be convenient to summarise our objectives
and directions of activity in Trans-Caspia and on the Caspian. The three principal
objectives are as follows :—
fa.) To control Caspian shipping.
( 6 .) To occupy Baku, for as long as there is any hope of holding it.
(c.) To occupy Krasnovodsk permanently.
2. We have so often emphasised the importance of our gaining control of the
Caspian fleet, and destroying what we cannot control that we will not dwell on it
again.
3. The object of occupying Baku is, in the first place, to accomplish (a), and
secondly, if it is impossible to effect a continued occupation, to render the oil-fields
and port useless for many months to the enemy. So soon as this is complete, and
unless the situation at Astrakhan develops so much in our favour as to justify hopes of
early co-operation, we should no longer attempt to defend Baku against superior
forces, but should transfer to Krasnovodsk our detachment there, together with any
local forces, including possibly Bicharakoff, which will hereafter be useful to us.
Having this consideration in view, G.O.C., Mesopotamia, is doubtless securing
the necessary shipping for use at the opportune moment. It is quite likely, however,
that the activities of Alexieff north of the Caucasus may re-act favourably on the
situation at Baku, and enable us to maintain our hold there.
4 . Guns are the main consideration at Krasnovodsk. These can be most rapidly
obtained from Marshall, who should at once take this matter in hand. Our occupation
of Krasnovodsk will be maintained, and every effort should be made by Mesopotamia
and Malleson to build up a force there and arrange a satisfactory seaward defence. It
is as yet too early to say what should be the strength of this garrison. When guns
become available perhaps some of the shipping now held for Malleson at Krasnovodsk
might go to Enzeli to fetch them.
5. We have full confidence that both Malleson and Mesopotamia realise the
urgency of achieving above objectives, and that they are doing their utmost to meet
this difficult and obscure situation in Central Asia.
6 . Though the Caspian Littoral falls under Mesopotamia’s control, and Trans-
Caspian under India’s, we wish at the same time to lay stress on the point that such
limits should not hinder any necessary action which should and must be taken by
either party outside his sphere. It seems a case where the man on the spot must be
trusted, and where, in order to gain our objectives energetic and rapid action without
reference to either India or the War Office must frequently be taken.
(Clear the Line.)
War Office to G.O.C., Mesopotamia (Repeated C.-in-C., India.)
64310 cipher. D.M.O. War Office, August 14, 1918.
YOUR X. 112 of the 12th August.
We agree with your proposal generally and cannot at this distance do more than
outline general policv, for which see my immediately preceding telegram. However,
the following replies are given to questions raised by you: —
1. If situation permits there is no objection to force up to three battalions and a
battery gcfing to Baku, and with such force it is hoped, should evacuation become
imperative, destruction of oil resources will be carried out by force, if necessary.
2 . We sanction the despatch of up to one battalion infantry to Krasnovodsk, but
in view of possibility of hostile transports entering port from Astrakhan, guns are all