Papers of the War Cabinet's Eastern Committee [‎94r] (187/544)

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and had a different decision been arrived at, the consequences, for which the Com-
nn ee would have been held responsible, might have been far-reaching and un
fortunate. °
J- ^- s a ln ^tler of fact, viewing the complexity of the problems concerned, and
t u hat ^!r Ve de P artmenta l or governing bodies, viz., War Cabinet, Foreign
me, India Office The department of the British Government to which the Government of India reported between 1858 and 1947. The successor to the Court of Directors. , Government of India, War Office, with their various diplomatic,
1111 nary, and political agents, are involved, out of which medley of opinion and
advice a single coherent policy has to be evolved, it seems to me that the Eastern
Committee, now that it has settled down to its work, does it with the minimum of
friction, and on the whole very reasonably well.
. ^ 1 were f° dilate upon what in my opinion is really its weakest point, I
siiouid liace to say more than I care about the position of the Chairman. Whereas
his colleagues of the foreign Office, India Office The department of the British Government to which the Government of India reported between 1858 and 1947. The successor to the Court of Directors. , and War Office come to the
meetings well posted in all that is passing, with the resources of highly efficient
Departments at their backs, with memoranda prepared for them by capable sub
ordinates, and with the advantage of having talked over matters in advance, the
C hairman enjoys no such advantages. He has no Department, no Secretariat, no
btaif. In so far as he forms an opinion upon the papers or telegrams that come in
before a meeting he has to form it alone. He takes the chair without any idea what
the Departments concerned may have in their minds or be about to propose.
1 his is an exceedingly difficult task, and I have never concealed my view that
if such a Committee as the Eastern Committee is to survive the war, or even if the
area which it supervises is to remain a main theatre of British and Indian political
and military action, a Secretary of State for the Middle East will be required, with
the full resources and personnel of a Department behind him, and with authority
over his own men.
But I do not raise that issue now, because we are dealing with a temporary and
critical emergency, which we have to meet with such devices as we can, and because
radical reconstruction is for the moment out of the question. When the war is over
the experience of the Eastern Committee may be of considerable value in guiding
the then Government to a more comprehensive and permanent solution.
9. Whether there should be Middle East Departments of the Foreign Office and
War Office is a matter which may safely be left to them to decide.
10. The proposal to hand over to the Indian Government full political and
military control of the countries lyin^ to the east of Palestine, or indeed of any portion
of them, other than the aieas already assigned or transferred, has been so adversely
criticised from every quarter that it is unnecessary to pursue the argument.
Whether we regard the feelings of the peoples and Governments concerned, the
attitude of our Allies, or the effect on public opinion in general, it cannot, I think, be
doubted that any such change of policy would be a source both of weakness and of
misunderstanding. Probably no Viceroy of India in modern times has taken a more
active interest in the affairs of Persia and contiguous countries than myself. But
if I had been asked, when in India, to assume political control at Teheran, I would
have preferred to be excused on the ground that the Eye of Persia still looks West
rather than East, and that her politics are not Indian but international.
The division between the spheres of the Foreign Office and the Government of
India is no doubt to some extent arbitrary and illogical, and when we get a Middle
East Department and Secretary of State it will in any case be modified, and will
perhaps disappear. But meanwhile we must get along with a not unworkable com
promise. It is no doubt disagreeable for the Government of India to be, so to speak,
yoked with a colleague at Teheran who is pursuing a not necessarily identical policy,
and who takes his orders from London. But it would be not only disagreeable but
dangerous to have a Minister at Teheran who might be pursuing a policy inspired
or dictated from Delhi, that did not fit in with the foreign policy of Downing Street.
Generally, I concur in Mr. Balfour’s view that we are not dealing unsuccessfully
with a complex situation, and that for the present no substantial changes are
required.
(Initialled.) C. of K.
August 1, 1918.
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