Papers of the War Cabinet's Eastern Committee [‎74v] (148/544)

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Annex (A).
Memorandum on M. Picot's Position in Palestine.
In the course of my discussions with M. Picot, he referred, as T expected he would,
to the position he had held in Palestine. He tol l me he had had a very bad time
indeed : his Government expected that he would have a share in the administration,
which indeed was promised in the War Cabinet decision of January PJ17, and though
his Paris chiefs would not move in the matter, they blamed him for not managing to
get what they would not press London to give him. However, he was good-humoured
about it, but pointed out that his position ought to be made clear before he returns.
In this I agree, and 1 submit that it would be a proper and graceful act on our
part if we were to inform the French that in all matters concerning political relations
between the L.E.F. and inhabitants of the areas of special interest to France that we
should use the French mission as our medium and that the C.I.C., Egypt Force, would
regard the French Commissioner as his political adviser on military-political questions
which directly concern these regions.
I am further of opinion that we should assure the French Government that, in
event of our occupying any part of these areas of special interest to France, w T e
should rely on the French mission to organise and control (with due regard to military
decision) any temporary administration which it might be necessary to set up.
This administration, it should be made plain, would be subject to the C.I.C., but
the personnel should be brench. At present I think M. Picot has to combat the idea
that we intend to take advantage of the military situation to set up a British civil
acini listration in Syria if we get there and call it a military administration.
krom an Entente point of view, this is an idea which should be dispelled, particu
larly as there is no immediate prospect of the case arising.
We are not laying any fresh difficulties in the path of the military, but anticipating
what might, if left to drift, prove a cause of unnecessary friction.
Annex (B).
1. In the opinion of the Governments of Great Britain and France there can be
no prospect of a permanent and lasting peace in the Middle East so long as non-
Ottoman nationalities, now subject to Ottoman rule, or inhabiting areas hitherto
subject to Ottoman rule now occupied by the Allied forces, have no adequate guarantee
of social, material, and political security.
2 . I hat the only guarantee of permanent improvement is to be found in the
securing of self-government to the inhabitants of such areas.
J. 1 hat in view of the condition of these areas arising from misgovernment,
devastation, and massacre, it is the opinion of the two Powers that a period of tutelage
must supervene before the inhabitants of these areas are capable of complete self-
government and in a position to maintain their independence.
1 . I hat the Powers exercising such tutelage should exercise it on the sanction of
the free nations of the world, and with the consent of the inhabitants of the areas
concerned.
Annex (C).
Declaration to the King of Hedjaz.
The Governments of Great Britain and France desire jointl } 7 to inform the
Government of Ilejaz that their policy in regard to the Arabic-speaking peoples of
Arabia, Syria, Jazirah, and Irak is as follows :—
1 . In such areas as v'ere free before the war the Governments recognise and
reaffirm the existing freedom and independence of the inhabitants.
2. In such areas as have been liberated since the war by the efforts of the
inhabitants, the two Governments recognise the complete and sovereign
independence of the inhabitants of those regions.