Papers of the War Cabinet's Eastern Committee [‎48v] (96/544)

British Policy in
Afghanistan and
Turkestan,
2. The Committee had before them a Note by the Chief of the.
Imperial General Staff on British Policy in Afghanistan and
Turkestan (E.C.-592) (Appendix).
The Chairman referred to a telegram from the Viceroy dated
the 11th June (E.C.-524) which stated that the Amir of
Afghanistan was maintaining a friendly attitude towards us, but
had recently put forward an embarrassing request for some
4,000,000 magazine rifles, 400 guns and ammunition, and 4 crores
of rupees Indian silver coin also widely used in the Persian Gulf. , promising that ii he were supplied with these, no foreign
enemy would ever pass through Afghanistan towards India. The
Chief of the Imperial General Staff, in his paper, proposed an
active policy, his view being that the main danger confronting us
in Asia made it impossible for us to do nothing. There was, of
course, the fear that if we assisted the Afghan Army with
w r eapons, these weapons might eventually be turned against us.
Briefly, General Wilson had suggested that we should now address
the Amir, and say: “We want you to come into the War on our
side to meet a danger common to us both, and to act as an active
ally; we will assist you, but not to the extent you wish; we will
assist you to recover territory which was snatched from you by
Russia some years ago, i.e., Penjdeh, and possibly also the regions
of Roshan and Shighnan.” The point was, should we be wise to
ask the Amir to enter into a definite alliance? One advantage of
General Wilson's proposal was that it did not suggest the entry
of British forces into Afghanistan nor the gift of a large quantity
of arms. At the present moment, the situation in Central Asia
made it necessary for us to seek allies there. Such allies might
possibly be found in Afghanistan and in Persia, and it would be
an effective stroke of policy to mobilise two great Moslem countries
on our side, although one was Shia and the other Sunni.
Mr. Montagu said that he had talked the matter over with
General Maedonogh, and. in order to save time, he had prepared,
as a basis of discussion, the draft of a telegram to the Viceroy,
who he felt certain ought to be consulted. At present, the case of
Afghanistan was very similar to that of Persia, except that the
Afghans were much more likely to turn against us unless we took
steps to secure their co-operation. We must persuade the Afghans
to defend their own country, and to seek the assistance of their
traditional ally, the Amir of Bokhara. He thought that the
Indian Government, who were very proud of having kept
Afghanistan neutral, would be rather startled at the present
proposal, and would feel a good deal of hesitation about accepting
it. His Department was generally in favour of the policy advo
cated by General Wilson subject to the proviso that the concur
rence of the Indian Government was obtained. Mr. Montagu
then read the following draft telegram:
“ Foreign Secret. Your telegram of the 17th June.
“ Turkestan. Enemy advance in Caucasus and possibility
of its extension East of Caspian have made it necessary to
consider carefully whole military situation in Central Asia
and delimitation of spheres of control as between Government
of India and War Office. After full consideration His
Majesty's Government have decided that regions immediately
adjoining West and Northern frontiers of Afghanistan and
Indian Empire shall be regarded as a single military theatre
under control of Government of India. Area will include
South and East Persia, Trans-Caspia and Turkestan, but not
North-west Persia, where Dunsterville’s operations will
remain under General Officer Commanding, Mesopotamia,
who will also be responsible for Dizful, Shuster, oil-fields and
Bakhtiari. As regards South Persia, you have already been
informed of decision to detach command of British troops