Papers of the War Cabinet's Eastern Committee [‎30r] (59/544)

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decision (E.C.-375), and that there was nothing more to be done for
the present (Minute G (1) of the proceedings of the 10th Meeting).
Mr. Montagu pointed out that the situation was changing from
day to day. The Committee were in ignorance of the real position
in South Persia at the present moment. Soulet was said to be back
and full of fight, and the South Persia Rifles were not to be relied
upon. In his view our only hope lay in an alliance.
General Smuts said that lie did not regard the situation in a
tragic light, but thought it might be relieved by the reinforcement
of Sir P. Sykes by two battalions.
Mr. Montagu considered that this reinforcement would be quite
inadequate.
The Chairman was of opinion that the present occasion was hardly
suitable for the discussion of the entire question of our Persian
policy. He was prepared to name a very early date for a meeting of
the Committee, if the Secretary of State for India desired that the
whole problem should be re-examined. In the meantime he was
preparing a paper on the question arising from a memorandum he
had received from the Secretary of State for India.
Mr. Montagu said that he accepted the Chairman’s decision, but
he wished it to be recorded in the Minutes that he regarded the subject
as one which arose from their discussion that afternoon, and, further,
as one of extreme urgency, lie undertook to prepare at once a
' revised note giving his latest views on the question.
3. The Chairman read out two telegrams from the Commander-
in-Chief in India, the gist of which was as follows :—
Situation in South
Persia:
Sir P. Sykes.
Telegram No. 42357, 30th May : Sir P. Sykes wired that his
staff and he considered that two battalions and one mountain battery
were the maximum force that could be moved up, and that it would
be adequate to deal with any opposition on the Tarum-Niriz-Shiraz
line. The certainty of reinforcements would keep the Kawam whole
heartedly on our side. In the opinion of the Indian Government
about G,000 or 7,000 reinforcements were required for Bushire. In
Shiraz they had supplies for two months, and from the new harvest
could buy or seize enough for a third month. Soulet would be
attacked if a favourable opportunity presented itself. The difficulty
was that the South Persia Rifles might mutiny, and the Kawam Arabs
might join against us if we have the slightest reverse. The Indian
garrison was therefore necessary in Shiraz, which left little margin
for an offensive column. Sykes had decided to. allow officers and
men of the South Persia Rifles choice of resignation, but had
promised a bonus of two months’ pay to all who would stand by us
to the end of the war. In Sykes’s view the main cause of the disloyal
action of the South Persia Rifles was a note delivered by the
Legation which provoked an unfriendly reply by the Persian
Government and led to desertions on a large scale and the tragedy
at Khaneh Zinian. Sykes had not been consulted by the Minister
in the negotiation he had Conducted with the Persian Government
relating to the South Persia Rifles.
Telegram No. 42435, 30rh May: Although the War Office, in
their telegram of the 29th May, stated that it was neither desirable
nor necessary to reinforce Sykes, this was not the view held either
by Sykes himself or the consid. Control of the South Persia Rifles
had been discussed for the last year and a half, but it had been
decided last March that Sykes should remain under Marling’s
orders, although, so far as the Commander-in-Chief ifi India knew.
Marling had issued no orders to Sykes in regard to his present
difficulties. Sykes proposed two lines of operation, viz., via Bushire
and Bandar Abbas, but in neither cast 1 could reinforcements reach
him in less than two months from date of departure from India. It
was apparent that the disarmament and disbandment of the Pars