Papers of the War Cabinet's Eastern Committee [‎28v] (56/544)

At Baku there was apparently a local Government of some
kind, which was understood to be friendly to us. (hir vice-consul
there had informed us that he had heard that two 1 urkish regiments
had been allowed to pass through to Baku to assist the local
Mussulman Division against the Baku Government. Mr. MacDonnell
also stated that the immediate arrival of, at least, one British olficer
at Baku was of the utmost importance, in order, it seemed, to
consolidate the friendly elements in that quarter. As regards
Sir C. Marling, telegrams had been received indicating a change
from his previous attitude. At first he had appeared to be against
the proposed move to Baku. But in his telegram of the -Sth May
(E.C. 418), he stated that all his information went to show that
Dunsterville was anxiously awaited at Baku, and it was only by his
going there that the Caspian fleet could be secured ; that there was
also a prospect that we might be able to gain over the Jangalis, in
which case Dunsterville’s retreat from Baku would be assured ; and,
further, that in view of the extreme importance of securing the
Fleet and destroying the oilfields, he hoped that the position might
be re-examined. The Chairman pointed out that this involved a
considerable expansion of the original Dunsterville programme.
The Chairman then read out telegram No. 473 from Sir
Charles Marling, dated the 29th May, stating that the writer The lowest of the four classes into which East India Company civil servants were divided. A Writer’s duties originally consisted mostly of copying documents and book-keeping. would
be grateful for some indication of our immediate aims in North-West
Persia; early in March he understood that a sufficient force was to
be despatched to North-West Persia with a view to stabilising the
situation there and prevent the ingress of enemy agents, but later
also for the purpose of keeping open the road to the Caucasus. He
now learned that Dunsterville’s Mission was countermanded just at
the moment when, so far as the former’s information went, he had
a better chance of achieving something than ever before, and when
it seemed most necessary to take any risk in order to make things
safe at Baku.
Lord R. Cecil said that he regarded this as a very mysterious
telegram.
General Smuts regarded it as an attempt to review the whole
situation. In March we had adopted a certain policy. Now, how
ever, when, conditions had changed, and there was a favourable
opportunity of General Dunsterville doing good at Baku, we had
prevented his going there, although it seemed that the Bolsheviks
were friendly.
Mr. Montagu thought that the proposed Mission was interpreted
in two mutually conflicting ways. There were really two proposals :
(1) that General Dunsterville should go alone to Baku as an agent
to cajole and persuade the friendly tribes in the neighbourhood;
(2) General Dunsterville’s own proposal to take with him some of
the 14th Hussars and Hampshire Regiment, which would involve a
departure from our policy, and the detachment of troops from the
Hamadan-Kasvin line.
Lord R. Cecil thought that what General Dunsterville regarded
as necessary at Baku was a force, and not merely an agent. That
force might be either a mixed detachment of British troops or
Bicharakoft’s troops. In his mind there was no distinction between
the two suggestions.
Mr. Montagu, referring to Mr. MacDonnell’s message (E.C -136),
said that the invitation was that, as the Bolsheviks were apparently
friendly, and were sending 300 infantry to Enzeli, General Dunster
ville should go to Baku. He himself was impressed with the
necessity of adhering to our policy, and not risking the dissipation
of our strength on side-issues. Supposing General Dunsterville were
in difficulties, it would be impossible for us either to protect or to
reinforce him.
Lord R. Cecil pointed out that Baku was really part of our
cordon, otherwise the Caspian would be handed over to c ur
enemies.