Papers of the War Cabinet's Eastern Committee [‎19v] (38/544)

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Christians (E.C.-229). He had never before suggested that the
arrival of British officers could be detrimental to them. His
suggestion that the expedition would furnish a pretext to the I urks
to massacre Christians indiscriminately was a strange one, for the
Turks would need no pretext, and the best protection to the
Christians was to keep the Turks at a distance. As to the risk
the small party General Dunsterville proposed to send might run,
there was evidence that the Turks had been sending small parties
into Persia. If small parties of Turks could move, it was likely
that small parties of British would have equal liberty of movement,
especially since the defeat of the Sinjabis, of the Turks by the
Jelus (E.C.-228), and our own success at Kerkuk. The W ar Office
was therefore of opinion that the expedition should proceed.
Mr. Oliphant read out a telegram just received from
Sir C. Marling, No. 394, in which he stated that the Persian
Government was seriously alarmed by the advance of Turkish troops
in Azerbaijan, and hinted that this alarm might, with encourage
ment, lead to a rupture of relations, or even a state of war, between
Persia and Turkey, should His Majesty’s Government not “still
adhere to the policy of keeping Persia out of the war.”
It was pointed out that His Majesty’s Government had always
preferred Persian neutrality to Persia’s alliance with our enemies,
but had never yet had to chouse between Persian neutrality and
Persia’s active opposition to our enemies. This alternative there
was no reason to reject. Even if Persia’s belligerency against the
Turks presented possible disadvantages for us, a rupture of relations
between the two was unobjectionable.
In reply to an enquiry from the Chairman, Mr. Oliphant
expressed the view that if Persia were to break off relations it would
be of considerable moral benefit to us, even though of little material
use.
Mr. Shuckburgh concurred in this opinion.
It was decided therefore—
That Sir C. Marling should be informed by the Foreign Office
that these were the views of His Majesty’s Government.
The question was then asked whether the sending of British
officers among the Nestorians without the expressed consent of the
Persian Government would further or hamper the policy of getting
Persia on our side.
Mr. Oliphant was of opinion that it might delay matters ; the
pr esent Persian Cabinet was not altogether satisfactory ; we should
have to explain our action, and the Persians might seize on it as a
pretext for hesitation.
The Chai rman said that there were three courses open to us: —
1. To decide with Sir C. Marling to stop the expedition.
2. To let the expedition proceed, and to inform Sir C. Marling
of our reasons for doing so.
3. To telegraph to him that we proposed to authorise the
expedition, but would like to know that it would not
have an unfavourable effect on the larger issue.
The Chief of the Imperial General Staff said that from his point
of view it was desirable that the expedition should start at once.
Sir C. Marling had expressed very strong views on the subject, and
he was not likely to alter; as to breaking with Turkey, it was not
likely that the Persians would make up their minds to take such a
step for months.
Lord Hardinge expressed the view that if the expedition was to
proceed it was best to take all responsibility for it from Sir C.
Marling.
The Foreign Office and the India Office The department of the British Government to which the Government of India reported between 1858 and 1947. The successor to the Court of Directors. , having expressed their
concurrence with the War Office on the subject, it was decided—