Papers of the War Cabinet's Eastern Committee [‎18v] (36/544)

o
Bicharakof.
General Apprecia
tion of the Attitude
of the Persian
Government.
The usual European element, i.c., one battalion to a brigade,
was not easy to find. In this connection the suggestion made in
Sir H. V. Cox’s memorandum (E C. 222, last paragraph), that a
Gurkha battalion should take the place of a British one, might be
commended to the Government of India. By this means the
breaking up of the I3th Division could be avoided.
The Committee agreed with the estimate of the danger to India
formed by the General Staff and Sir II. V. Cox, and it was understood
that the War Office would communicate to the military authorities
in India the directions and suggestions contained in the War Office
and India ()ffice memoranda above mentioned.
2. With reference to Minute 1 of the 6th Meeting, the Chairman
read a telegram from Sir C. Marling (No. 302) in answer to the
Committee’s request for his advice. After discussion it Avas
concluded that the best course was to furnish Bicharakof with
enough money to keep his force in Persia, until we were able to
dispense with it, and not enough to enable him to embark on larger
ventures in the Caucasus or in Russia.
It was understood that the War Office and the' 1 reasury were
engaged in negotiations as to the scale of payment justifiable, with
the object of keeping his force employed on our side in Persia.
General Dunsterville had been asked to give details of Bicharakof s
expenditure.
It was agreed —
That General Macdonogh would raise the question again at a
later date.
3. Attention was drawn by the chairman to the absence of a
general appreciation by Sir C. Marling of the attitude of the Persian
Government to our policy. For instance, we had no information
enabling us to formulate answers to such concrete questions as, e.g.,
Are the provincial governors, who are all-important in Persia,
instructed to resist the advance of our forces or to acquiesce ?
What is the attitude of the Persian Government towards the Jangali
movement and enemy activity in general^ Is the position of the
Persian Government vis-d-vis of our recent action one of sullen
resignation, or is it openly hostile ? Or does the possible appoint
ment of an Anglophil Premier, hinted at by Sir C. Marling, indicate
a pro-Entente policy ? Are we in fact regarded as the friends or the
enemies of the Persian people ?
General Smuts drew attention to a Persian denunciation of the
1907 agreement between Great Britain and Russia, reported by Sir
W. Townley from The Hague and mentioned by the press. If it
had not been denounced to us, why had it been denounced in
Holland ?
The chairman pointed out that the Anglo-Russian Convention
of 1907 was an agreement between the British and Russian Govern
ments, and that it was not, therefore, open to the Persian (lovernment
to denounce it. Further, on behalf of the British Government he
had stated in the House of Lords that we regarded the agreement as
in suspense, and were prepared, as soon as there was a responsible
Russian Government in existence, to reconsider it. There was,
ther efore, no need for any new declaration on the point.
X V 5? ^nr7TIalfour agreed that it was not easyTcfanswer such questions,
and undertook to obtain a survey of the situation from Sir C. Marling
which would furnish the Committee with the desired information.
2, Whitehall Gardens, S.TT.,
Mag 7, 19IS.