Ext 6116/46(S) 'Secret Weekly Political Intelligence Summaries, nos 356-416, August 1946-November 1947' [‎356v] (728/978)

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in-Chief of the Siamese Army., or Nai
Kuang, the leader of the Democrats, and
that in either case Pibul—never likely to
remain long in a subordinate position—
might start by accepting one of the Minis
tries. In present circumstances, however,
it is not at all certain that earlier expec
tations of the fall of the present Govern
ment will be realised when the Legislature
reassembles this week. It is understood
that the Prime Minister has wearied of the
constant flow of criticisms levelled at him
from all quarters and is, himself, anxious
to withdraw from politics. Nevertheless,
the Constitutionalists and Independents
are urging that he should remain at the
helm—a plea that has been greatly
strengthened by the advice of the Senior
Statesman and the encouragement derived
from President Truman's recent expression
of hope to the newly-appointed Siamese
Ambassador to Washington that there
might be a continuation of stable and demo
cratic Government in Siam. In these cir
cumstances Luang Dhamrong elected to
withhold his final decision until after a
meeting that had been arranged by ft
friends with Luang Pradit in the Chair.
What was the result of this consultation
has not yet been made known. Expressions
of Siamese opinion, however, are becoming
increasingly confident that Luang Dham
rong will continue in office at the head of
a re-shuffled Cabinet. The Senior States
man, it may be noted, has left for
Washington in connexion with the Franco-
Siamese Conciliation Commission.
THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
Mr. Marshall’s broadcast of the 28th
April (see last week’s Summary) has pro
vided the framework for continued press
and radio discussion in the United States
on the lessons of the Moscow Conference.
The unruffled manner in which the Secre
tary of State presented his report on the
negotiations has been widely praised, and
even critics of the current foreign policy
like Mr. Max Lerner, of the Left-wing
newspaper P.M., have been constrained to
admit that there is no political figure
to-day more completely deserving of
national respect. It is widely conceded that
relations between the United States and
the Soviet Union are “ now down to bed
rock.” There is also general agreement
that it is the Russians who have the most
to gain by procrastinating with the peace
settlement while Europe drifts into chaos.
In this connexion Mr. John Foster
Dulles, who served as Mr. Marshall’s
special adviser at the Conference, has
attracted much attention with his assertion,
in a broadcast of the 29th April, that
Soviet foreign policy depends “ little on
getting results by diplomatic negotiation ”
and much on penetration and infiltration
into the political organizations and the
labour movements of other countries. This
being the case, Mr. Dulles contends that
one aim of the new foreign policy should
be to “pump vitality into Western
Europe ’ ’ and to make it clear that, what
ever happens, the United States will never
again disinterest itself in that part of the
world. That other thoughtful Republican
leaders are beginning to share this con
viction is evident from the statement
which Senator Vandenberg issued on the
29th endorsing Mr. Marshall’s broadcast.
It would be worth a supreme effort, Senator
Vandenberg suggested, to seek agreement
with the Soviet Union during the coming
months. Nevertheless, if this were “ beyond
reasonable reach,” the United States could
not “ wait too long for a peace programme
which at least unites those who can agree.”
Even among Republicans there is still a
hope—as Mr. Harold Stassen indicated at
his press conference on the 5th May—that
some degree of accommodation will yet be
possible with the Soviet Union. On the
other hand, the American public as a
whole has clearly been less bemused this
time by the promises which Generalissimo
Stalin held out in the conversations with
Mr. Stassen published on the 3rd May.
It may be to some extent unfortunate
that Mr. Stassen, as the spokesman of the
liberal wing of the Republican party,
should have chosen the occasion of his press
conference on the 5th to criticize the
President's policy. (He did, however,
make it clear that he supported the Greco-
Turkish Aid Bill in its present amended
form.) Such criticism will probably not
affect the final vote of the House of
Representatives on Mr. Truman’s pro
gramme, but it does serve to emphasize the
dissensions with which Mr. Stassen's own
party is torn at the moment. As it is,
some ‘ ‘ Old Guard ’ ’ Republicans who have
no love for the ex-Governor of Minnesota,
have joined forces with the Russophil
Democrats to oppose the Greco-Turkish
Aid Bill in the House Committee on Rules.
The same elements, apparently disliking