Ext 6116/46(S) 'Secret Weekly Political Intelligence Summaries, nos 356-416, August 1946-November 1947' [‎217r] (441/978)

touch with the work of the Paris organisa
tion. M. Zorin (U.S.S.R.) read, with
deliberate emphasis, a long prepared
statement, in which he said that the British
and French had made their plans before
they consulted U.S.S.R. who had no in-
farmation about the real possibility of
Anerican aid or about what Mr. Clayton
had been saying in London, that the
British and French did not tell U.S.S.R.
what their intentions were or what the
American plan really was, that they
intended not the economic recovery of
Europe but the use of this plan to set up
an organisation outside the United Nations
to interfere in the economic life of Euro
pean countries for their own benefit, and
that they were trying to get Germany in
cluded, though this was a matter for the
four occupying Powers and no one else.
The Anglo-French assurance that no
derogation of sovereignty was intended,
continued M. Zorin, was belied by the
Greek and Turkish agreements with U.S.A.
M. Molotov at Paris had shown how the
matter should be handled and had warned
against the danger of dividing Europe. No
one would believe the Anglo-French
assurance that they were not trying to by
pass E.C.E. and to divide Europe. Russia
knew only too well what interference
meant; she only wanted co-operation to
restore and secure political and economic
freedom for all.
Mr. Neil (U.K.) at once objected to this
scurrilous attack, and demolished the
accusations one after another. He
ridiculed the supposed anti-Soviet “ plot ”
and said that M. Molotov’s demand for a
previous assurance that Congress would
support the Marshall offer “ showed an
infantile ignorance of democratic proce
dure.” M. Andre Philip (France) said
that M. Zorin’s accusations were moon
shine—mere romance. To ask the United
States to foot the bill for European
requirements without showing, as M. Blum
had done for France in Washington, what
they were doing for themselves was not
consistent with either dignity or indepen
dence. The Marshall offer, he thought, gave
Europe the chance to become a going con
cern once more. No information was
withheld, and countries were free to give
what replies they wished. He did not for
for a moment believe that Russia with
drew because she feared a plot but assumed
that it was because she could not under
stand and was over-suspicious.
At a later discussion the Swedish dele
gate supported by those of the other
Scandinavian countries, emphasised that
the Paris organisation which was tem
porary, must not be in conflict with E.C.E.
The Belgian delegate (M. de Stryker)
brought up the question of German trade.
He thought the method of arranging
import and export transactions in dollars
at an arbitrary rate of exchange a cum
brous one, and a serious obstacle to
European recovery. M. Zorin objected to
this matter being discussed at all; it was
outside the scope of E.C.E. and was the
concern of the four occupying Powers;
moreover, twenty-one days’ notice should
have been given. The Belgian proposal to
add this item to the Agenda was, however,
approved; in the discussion which followed,
the U.K. delegate undertook to bring to
the notice of the zonal authorities any
claims which the non-controlling Powers
might wish to make. This question will
come up again at a later session of the
Council.
Proposals for liaison between the Com
mission’s secretariat and the Occupation
authorities in Germany led to a similar
clash of opinions. The Russian view was
that E.C.E. should have no direct com
munication with zonal authorities; that
would only play into the hands of the
Western Powers, who wanted to divide
Germany and Europe. This was opposed
by U.S.A., U.K. and France. In this con
nection Mr. McNeil asked history to say
who had violated the Potsdam doctrine
that Germany was an economic unity, the
Western Powers or Russia. In the end it
was decided that E.C.E. should be the
forum for questions of trade between
Gerjnany and the rest of Europe and that
while the occupying Powers alone had the
right to decide (and where necessary to
allocate), E.C.E. should have liaison both
with Berlin and with the Zones.
The report of the Inland Transport Com
mittee was adopted, after a strong Russian
objection—which was not accepted by the
Commission—to that Committee having
any say in the matter of international
waterways. The Coal Committee, successor
of E.C.O. with the addition of U.S.S.R.,
was also set up; M. Zorin clearly wanted
this to be merely a consultative body and
to have no initiative. It will continue, how
ever, to make recommendations on alloca
tions direct to member Governments.
The new Committees are to begin their
meetings early in September. The next
session of the E.C.E. will probably be held
in January 1948.