Ext 6116/46(S) 'Secret Weekly Political Intelligence Summaries, nos 356-416, August 1946-November 1947' [‎206r] (419/978)

7
Folhaflokkur since the elections to the
assembly last November (see Summary
No. 368) there is little reason to doubt that
it will be accepted.
^ LOW COUNTRIES
The Netherlands
Simultaneously with the opening of
local military operations in Java [see
under “The Far East’’], the Dutch
Prime Minister, Dr. Beel, in a broadcast
to the Dutch people (20th July), explained
his Government’s action. The Government,
said Dr. Beel, had authorized the Lieut-
Governor-General, Dr. van Mook, “ in
view of the continuation and even intensi
fication of hostilities and demolitions ”
to employ the forces at his disposal for
“ police action ” in order to do what the
Republic appears incapable of doing. Dr.
Beel declared that the Government had
been “ as accommodating as possible
towards the Republic, shewing full appre
ciation of the healthy nationalist current
in Indonesia,” but that they could not
“ tolerate ” the “ daily violations ” of the
Linggadjati Agreement, to the principles
of which they still adhered. As soon as
leadership of the Republic, “ capable of
real co-operation in accordance with Ling
gadjati,” had been established, a place
would be found for the Republic on an
equality with ‘ ‘ that now occupied by other
States of Indonesia.” Up to Tuesday
[15th July], continued Dr. Beel, the Gov
ernment had hopes of reaching agreement
with the Indonesian Prime Minister, but
the Indonesian Cabinet had repudiated
him. Dutch sovereignty had been rejected
by the Republic, which had violated agree
ment after agreement. The Netherlands
Government, therefore, felt no longer
bound by the Linggadjati Agreement; but
they were prepared to negotiate ‘ ‘ at any
moment with any Republican Government
willing and able to fulfil the terms of the
Agreement.”
Discussing the situation with Dr. van
Vredenburch, Political Director of the
Dutch Foreign Office, on the eve of the
military operations, H.M. Charge
d’Affaires said that he felt sure that Dr.
van Vredenburch would agree that it was
of the utmost importance, not only from
the point of view of the Netherlands but
also from that of her friends, that a solu
tion be found which avoided the use of
force. There was a possibility (which
could not be ignored) that the matter
might be referred to the United Nations,
the result of which would be to cause em
barrassment to the U.S.A. and the U.K.
and to many other countries besides.
There was a possibility, too, that the issue
might endanger Western European and
American solidarity, which would be par
ticularly deplorable at a time when so
much hope was being pinned on the out
come of the Paris Conference. Further
more, however good a case the Dutch
thought they could make out, American
and British public opinion would inevit
ably blame whichever side fired the first
shot. Dr. van Vredenburch expressed
himself as being in complete agreement
with these views; but asserted that, so far
as the Dutch were concerned, the position
—particularly from an economic point of
view—was becoming untenable, with the
result that an immediate solution had to be
found. Hitherto not one of the Dutch
proposals on paper had been agreed to by
the Indonesians : they were ready enough
to agree to them orally, but as soon as they
returned to Jogjakarta they repudiated
them. Such a state of affairs could not go
on. H.M. Charge d’Affaires then suggested
that perhaps the Dutch in Java had failed
sufficiently to take into account Oriental
“ face.” In the past it might have been
possible to obtain complete satisfaction for
an unilateral request supported by force
and ultimata; but a new era of relationship
with the peoples of the East had been
ushered in, of which the Indonesians were
well aware. H.M. Charge d’Affaires
assured Dr. van Vredenburch of Great
Britain’s fullest sympathy with the Dutch
need for an immediate solution, but ex
pressed the view that, even under the strain
of continued patience, it was more likely to
be achieved without the use of force pro
vided that they paid more regard to
Oriental psychology.
An urgent appeal against any strike
action as a result of the Indonesian crisis
has been issued to Dutch workers by the
Executive Board of the Dutch Association
of Trades Unions, but the Unity Trade
Union (Communist) has called on all tran
sport workers, dockers and seamen to boy
cott all transport to Indonesia from both
Dutch and foreign ports.
FRANCE
The French, from M. Bidault down
wards, were thrown into considerable
alarm and despondency about the possible
consequences—both on the domestic situa
tion and on the Paris Conference—of any